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Creating Space for Community Representation in
Police Reform Litigation
AYESHA BELL HARDAWAY*

Input from affected communities is an essential component of the
reform process aimed at remedying unconstitutional police practices.
Yet, no court has ever granted a community organization’s motion to
intervene as a matter of right in police reform, consent decree cases initiated by the Department of Justice. Judicial opinions in those cases have
truncated the Federal Civil Rule 24 analysis when evaluating the interests of impacted communities. Thus, the most success achieved by a few
community organizations has been permissive intervention or amici status. The models used by the Department of Justice to elicit the community
perspective have been frustrating and have failed to incorporate community voice with equal weight and authority in the process. This Article
identifies a uniform standard for courts to utilize in public law cases
when community organizations seek intervention and proposes an alternative approach to the composition and structure of organizations so
that the voices and input of those affected by police brutality are included
in a meaningful way. The solution proposed by this Article involves
applying an adequate representation analysis more suitable for the
dynamic relationship between the federal government and marginalized
communities. The right to intervene can be attained by those impacted by
police violence while alleviating practical and representative concerns
articulated by the judiciary in prior reform cases.
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3.
CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
Courts overseeing police reform consent decrees have presumed that the
federal government adequately represents the interest of communities
impacted by police violence. This presumption is derived from judicial
interpretations of Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
governs when a third party can successfully intervene in existing litigation.1
Those interpretations, however, are not rooted in the origins or purpose of
that Rule. Courts managing Department of Justice (DOJ)-initiated consent
decrees have failed to acknowledge the unique relationship between the
federal government and communities impacted by police violence. They
have, instead, relied heavily on the traditional legal theory that the government speaks for its citizens. This misapplication not only frustrates the purpose of Rule 24 but also undermines the legitimacy of police reforms.
1. (a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is
so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
(b) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION.
(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who:
(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.
(2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On timely motion, the court may permit a federal
or state governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party’s claim or defense is
based on:
(A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or
(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or
executive order.
(3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.

FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)–(b).
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Impacted communities2 have attempted to have their insight and lived experience included in various approaches to police reform. One way that those efforts
have been seen is in attempts to intervene in consent decrees initiated by the DOJ.
Those intervention attempts have been made by community members impacted
by police misconduct and the organizations representing their interests. No federal trial court in that context has ever recognized the right of a community organization to intervene as a party. Courts have at most granted permissive
intervention, and that was granted only after appeal.3 The essential nature of
impacted community inclusion carries much more weight than permissive intervention connotes. By granting the intervention request permissively, the courts
have refused to recognize that the community organization had a right to intervene. The denial of the right to formally participate in DOJ-initiated police
reform litigation compounds the pre-existing marginalization of impacted
communities.
Disregarding the voices of those harmed by police violence is not new.4 The
presumption by courts that the federal government adequately represents the
interests of impacted communities only serves to reinforce that marginalization.
2. This Article deliberately focuses on communities impacted by police violence. Marginalized
communities—including communities of color, members of LGBTQIAþ communities, and those
experiencing mental health crises—have historically been, and are presently being, subjected to
disproportionate incidents of violence, searches, and arrests by police officers serving their
communities. See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The
Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 127–28 (2017) (describing
the disproportionate level of police contact—stop, searches, and arrests—that African Americans have
had with law enforcement in Ferguson and in New York City); Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan
Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe
Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in
Police Stops Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 736 (2020) (finding that, in a study
of nearly 100 million traffic stops conducted by twenty-one state patrol departments and thirty-five
municipal police departments, officers demonstrated racial bias when deciding who to stop and whether
to conduct a search); CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, UNJUST: HOW
THE BROKEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILS LGBT PEOPLE 46 (2016), https://www.lgbtmap.org/file/
lgbt-criminal-justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DFP-PHMD] (finding that discriminatory police practices
targeting LGBTQIAþ youth led to disproportionate citations and interactions in New York and New
Orleans, respectively, and that “LGBTQ youth were at increased risk of police stops compared to their
non-LGBTQ peers”); Deidre McPhillips, Deaths from Police Harm Disproportionately Affect People of
Color, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 3, 2020, 4:07 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2020-06-03/data-show-deaths-from-police-violence-disproportionately-affect-people-of-color [https://
perma.cc/R7UK-QGKC]. Federal investigations into patterns and practices of unconstitutional policing
and any subsequent interventions have been necessary in those communities. It is, therefore, not
surprising that communities unaffected by police violence and misconduct have not attempted to initiate
police reform efforts in their communities. In contrast, it is the communities impacted by
unconstitutional policing that have been engaged in efforts to reform police practices. And it is on the
misconduct disproportionately experienced by these communities that federal intervention efforts have
been focused. Nothing in this Article aims to oversimplify the myriad of viewpoints and opinions of
communities impacted by unconstitutional policing regarding the scope and depth of reforms that
members of impacted communities desire to see in the places where they live and work.
3. See United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 404 (9th Cir. 2002).
4. See NYC CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., A MUTATED RULE: LACK OF ENFORCEMENT IN THE
FACE OF PERSISTENT CHOKEHOLD COMPLAINTS IN NEW YORK CITY 19 (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/
html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/Chokehold%20Study_20141007.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C78-WUZT] (finding
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A great degree of contemporaneous and historical irony exists in that presumption. The Trump Administration disavowed any prior commitment to federal
efforts of police reform.5 The Office of the Attorney General declared unmitigated allegiance to its partnerships with local law enforcement agencies.6 In
doing so, it failed to acknowledge any role in ensuring accountability of local
police agencies.7 The Attorney General’s memorandum concluded with directives to department employees to evaluate “existing or contemplated” consent
decrees to ensure conformity with these principles of allegiance.8 The Trump
Administration’s attempt to renege on the pattern or practice reforms in
Baltimore that began during the Obama Administration is a salient example of
the variable nature of the federal government’s approach to police reform. It also
exemplifies the federal judiciary’s rejection of community efforts to intervene.
Prior to the 2016 election, the DOJ launched an investigation of the Baltimore
Police Department following the in-custody death of Freddie Gray.9 On April 12,
2015—just after 8:30 in the morning—Gray was reportedly chased by Baltimore
police officers after he glanced at them and then ran.10 Video of the arrest shows
that officers took Gray down with a “leg lace” maneuver and held him in handcuffs while waiting for a police van to arrive on scene.11 A bystander recording
the arrest observed that another officer also had a knee on Gray’s neck.12 Gray is
heard telling officers that he cannot breathe and requesting an inhaler.13 He is
then heard screaming in pain while being dragged to the van.14
An investigation by the Baltimore state’s attorney, Marilyn Mosby, revealed
that two officers and a lieutenant placed Gray face down on the floor of the back
of the police van.15 His hands, and eventually his feet, were bound, but he was not
the number of chokehold complaints had increased despite a citywide ban); see also G. Flint Taylor, The
Chicago Police Torture Scandal: A Legal and Political History, 17 CUNY L. REV. 329, 330–31, 343
(2014) (discussing the failures of Chicago public defenders to investigate instances of torture recounted
by defendants and the refusal of the state’s attorney to investigate and prosecute police officers for
reported acts of racially motivated, systemic torture).
5. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., DOJ, MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENT
COMPONENTS AND UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: SUPPORTING FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT 1 (2017) (“It is not the responsibility of the federal government to manage non-federal
law enforcement agencies.”).
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 2.
9. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
(2016).
10. Statement of Charges, State v. Grey, No. 6B02294074 (Md. Dist. Ct. Apr. 12, 2015), https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/2071377/gray-charging-documents.pdf [https://perma.cc/99FS-4V4U]; Arrest
to Death: What Happened to Freddie Gray, CBS NEWS (May 1, 2015, 7:17 PM) https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/arrest-to-death-what-happened-to-freddie-gray [https://perma.cc/2Y5R-HPAF].
11. Arrest to Death: What Happened to Freddie Gray, supra note 10; accord Catherine Rentz,
Videographer: Freddie Gray Was Folded Like ‘Origami,’ BALT. SUN (Apr. 23, 2015, 12:37 PM), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-gray-video-moore-20150423-story.html.
12. Rentz, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Arrest to Death: What Happened to Freddie Gray, supra note 10.
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secured in a seatbelt.16 Departmental policy reportedly required officers to secure
Gray in a seatbelt.17
Mosby concluded that Gray “suffered a severe and critical neck injury” while being
transported in the police van.18 The officer driving the van reportedly stopped several
times to check on Gray’s condition.19 Police accounts acknowledged that, at least
twice, Gray stated that he needed medical attention.20 At no point during the estimated
hour that Gray was under arrest did any of the officers seek medical care for him.21
Instead, they took Gray to the police station where he was found unconscious and not
breathing.22 Gray was pronounced dead seven days later on April 19, 2015.23
Gray’s killing also prompted the DOJ to begin an investigation into the practices
of the Baltimore Police Department.24 A Baltimore officer who spoke with the DOJ
characterized the transport process that led to Gray’s death as a “‘load and go’ . . .
with little regard for seatbelts.”25 The investigation found, among other things, that
Gray and other Black residents were disparately impacted and perhaps intentionally
discriminated against by the Baltimore police at every stage of interaction, from initial stops to uses of force.26 The DOJ concluded that racially disparate treatment
“erode[s] the community trust that is critical to effective policing.”27
On January 12, 2017, the DOJ and the City of Baltimore filed a proposed settlement agreement.28 Both parties indicated in the filing that resolving the case via
consent decree was fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the interest of the public.29
That proposed consent decree30 detailed comprehensive reforms for the Baltimore
Police Department.31

16. Eyder Peralta, Timeline: What We Know About the Freddie Gray Arrest, NPR (May 1, 2015, 8:23
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/01/403629104/baltimore-protests-what-weknow-about-the-freddie-gray-arrest [https://perma.cc/6QCR-DKEB].
17. Id.
18. Arrest to Death: What Happened to Freddie Gray, supra note 10.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Peralta, supra note 16.
22. Id.
23. Erik Ortiz, Freddie Gray: From Baltimore Arrest to Protests, a Timeline of the Case, NBC NEWS
(May 1, 2015, 3:09 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/timeline-freddie-graycase-arrest-protests-n351156 [https://perma.cc/RN54-95JD].
24. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 9.
25. Id. at 114.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree at 1, 3, United
States v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB), ECF No. 2-1.
29. Id. at 3.
30. A consent decree, in this context, is a judicially approved and monitored settlement agreement.
That agreement comes about after the filing of an action and as a result of negotiations related to the
terms. The settlement agreement does not become a consent decree unless and until the judge presiding
over the litigation makes such an order. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “consent decree” as “[a] court
decree that all parties agree to.” Consent Decree, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
31. See Consent Decree at 1–2, Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB),
ECF No. 2-2.
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The Trump Administration, however, disavowed the federal government’s
commitment to police reform.32 The Office of the Attorney General under the
Trump Administration expressly left the protection of civil rights to local law
enforcement.33 The DOJ filed a motion to stay the Baltimore consent decree proceedings while the Administration took time to “assess whether and how the provisions of the proposed consent decree interact with the directives of the
President and Attorney General.”34
With the future of the consent decree in doubt, a lifelong community member
and an organization representing a group of local churches filed a motion to intervene.35 The organization declared a “strong interest in ending unlawful and discriminatory police practices that have harmed [its members] in the past” along
with its desire to see the proposed consent decree fully enforced.36 To support its
assertion that the interests of Baltimore residents impacted by police violence
would not be adequately represented by the DOJ, the organization cited the “new
and different institutional priorities” of the federal government due to the change
in administration.37
Like each of the other courts that had previously ruled on the right to intervene
by community organizations asserting a right to join DOJ-initiated police litigation, the federal court in Baltimore denied community efforts to intervene.38 The
courts have done so even though consent decrees initiated by the DOJ are
designed to rectify unconstitutional patterns and practices of local police departments and, thereby, resolve a significant and pressing societal issue. As it currently stands, those public law cases are proceeding through the federal court
system with no actual representation of members of the communities impacted
by police misconduct.
It is important to recognize that this inquiry goes beyond the politics of
changing presidential administrations. Administrations of both political
parties have either been slow to intervene or refused to intervene at all. But
even federal administrations friendly to police consent decrees have yet to

32. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 5 (“Local law enforcement must protect and respect
the civil rights of all members of the public. Local control and local accountability are necessary for
effective local policing. It is not the responsibility of the federal government to manage non-federal law
enforcement agencies.”).
33. Id.
34. Motion for Continuance of Public Fairness Hearing at 4, Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814
(No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB), ECF No. 23.
35. See Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E.
Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene at 1–2, Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (No. 1:17-cv-00099JKB), ECF No. 30.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 5.
38. See Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 815 (addressing two discrete issues in its order:
whether the putative intervenors are needed to “support[] the approval of the Consent Decree,” and
whether they were needed to seek enforcement of the decree against the Baltimore Police Department
(quoting Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E.
Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 35, at 7)).
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convince many community organizations that they adequately represent
impacted communities.39
Existing scholarship has argued that police policies and procedures are created
in an undemocratic manner because they fail to go through a legislative process
that promotes democratic accountability.40 Other literature has examined how
collaborative efforts between community organizations, police departments, and
the DOJ have proven useful in reforming police departments.41
Many scholars have also identified the shortcomings of the statute that authorizes the federal government to initiate police reform litigation42 and have proposed a variety of solutions, each of which ultimately suggests that individuals be
given a private right of action in structural police reform litigation.43 Others have
specifically identified the lack of community inclusion in reform efforts led by
the DOJ and the resulting undemocratic nature of these efforts.44 Scholarship has
also challenged us to imagine a transformative approach to addressing police
violence.45
There remains, therefore, a central question of how best to include the insight,
experiences, and needs of impacted communities in structural police reform litigation. That question stands regardless of presidential priorities. This Article
seeks to expand the discussion of democratic police reforms through the use of
formal intervention.

39. Sunita Patel’s work exploring the undemocratic nature of community engagement models has
identified key issues across various consent decrees. Patel’s research found that—even under the consent
decree-friendly Obama Administration—DOJ-initiated reform efforts were not ideal in their approach to
incorporating impacted communities’ voices. She highlighted three indicators to support her finding:
(1) existing tension between community groups in some jurisdictions and the DOJ; (2) shortcomings in
the community engagement structures developed under certain DOJ consent decrees; and (3) lack of
agreement across jurisdictions that community engagement could correct the power differential between
police and the communities they serve. See Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision
for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 797
(2016).
40. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827,
1843–48 (2015).
41. See Jonathan M. Smith, Closing the Gap Between What Is Lawful and What Is Right in Police
Use of Force Jurisprudence by Making Police Departments More Democratic Institutions, 21 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 315, 342–46 (2016).
42. 34 U.S.C. § 12601(b) (2018) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141).
43. See, e.g., Avidan Y. Cover, Revisionist Municipal Liability, 52 GA. L. REV. 375, 423–24 (2018).
See generally Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000) (proposing an amendment to
pattern or practice litigation that would permit the DOJ to deputize select private citizens to seek
injunctive relief for persistent police abuses).
44. See Patel, supra note 39, at 799; Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New
Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
373, 416–17 (2010).
45. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 418–
34 (2018) (juxtaposing DOJ reports on Ferguson and Baltimore against the transformative approach
embraced by the Movement for Black Lives, including the emphasis on the demand for community
control instead of community input).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the procedural mechanism by
which community organizations have sought to join the litigation. Rule 24 provides two pathways for a potential litigant to become a party.46 The first pathway
under 24(a) requires the movant, or putative intervenor, to establish a legal right
to intervene either by federal statute or by satisfying three requirements of the
Rule.47 The second pathway under 24(b) requires the movant to have conditional
statutory authority or a question of law or fact in common with the main action.48
This Article makes the unique contribution of exploring judicial analyses of
motions to intervene using the first pathway. It also fills a gap in the existing literature as it explores the use of Rule 24(a) in police reform litigation to create a
more representative and participatory reform process.
Part I summarizes the origins and scope of authority under 34 U.S.C. § 1260149
and explores the evolution of attempts by the DOJ to engage community members in police consent decrees and why those efforts have been less than optimal.
Part II discusses the standard set forth for intervention under Rule 24, its purpose,
and the equity-driven motivation behind the 1966 amendment to the Rule. This
Part also explores the issue of standing and the adequate representation factor in
Rule 24(a) and how the courts have typically analyzed the issue. Part III provides
a comprehensive analysis of all community organization attempts to intervene in
consent decrees between the DOJ and police departments on behalf of impacted
community interests.
Part IV discusses the courts’ failure to appropriately consider whether
impacted communities are adequately represented in DOJ-initiated police reform
litigation and argues that the faulty analysis in this subset of cases ignores controlling case law. This Part then proposes a solution that requires an analysis
firmly rooted in the issues of marginalization, autonomy, inclusion, and distrust
present in American policing. It uses relevant portions of the prior cases as the
foundation for a proposed solution that provides community organizations the
right to intervene as parties in DOJ-initiated reform efforts while addressing
the practical and representative concerns articulated by the judiciary in prior cases.
The solution provides a novel approach to address the unmet needs of structural
police reform litigation as well as a means of sustainability. It also provides courts
with a model by which invested organizations can organize and collaborate with
aggrieved communities to address the current lack of representation.
I. DOJ-INITIATED POLICE REFORM LITIGATION
Congress granted to the U.S. Attorney General the right to investigate and sue
municipal and state governments to remedy unconstitutional police practices.50
46. See supra note 1.
47. Supra note 1.
48. Supra note 1.
49. Formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
50. See 34 U.S.C. § 12601(b) (2018) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141); see also Ayesha B. Hardaway,
Time Is Not on Our Side: Why Specious Claims of Collective Bargaining Rights Should Not Be Allowed
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The following Part proceeds in two Sections. First, it briefly explores the events
leading up to the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994.51 Second, it details the three iterative processes used by the DOJ in its
police reform litigation.
A. PASSAGE OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994

The U.S. government has a legitimacy problem with marginalized communities of color. Governmental action purportedly aimed to promote safety and the
rule of law has been viewed as social control over marginalized populations. An
examination of the entire Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 illustrates this point. The Act simultaneously increased incarceration of
inmates through measures expanding death penalty crimes,52 criminalizing gang
membership,53 and reducing opportunities for parole54 while empowering the federal government to enjoin unconstitutional police practices.55 The shift in scope
and duration of criminal punishments in America had an indelible and disparate
impact on the lives of and communities inhabited by people of color. The conflicting and dual nature of the federal intervention is not limited to just one administration or one act of Congress.56
Video footage capturing the barbaric beating of Rodney King on a Los
Angeles highway nearly eight years after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons,57 prompted Congress to hold hearings regarding police brutality.58 Federal lawmakers sought to “know how widespread . . . police misconduct [was] in Los Angeles and nationwide.”59 Congress then passed the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.60 That statute authorizes
to Delay Police Reform Efforts, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 137, 145–53 (2019) (detailing the persistent
problem of police violence in America that necessitated the passage of § 14141).
51. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at various locations in the U.S. Code, including 31
U.S.C. § 6715 (2018) and 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2018)).
52. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 60001–60002, 108 Stat. 1959, 1959–
68 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598 (2018)).
53. Id. § 150001, 108 Stat. at 2033–35 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 521 (2018)).
54. Id. § 20414, 108 Stat. at 1830–32 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3608 (2018)).
55. 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2018).
56. The Supreme Court decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena arguably stands for the
proposition that the federal government is in no better place to address matters of racial discrimination
than are state governments. The Court applied strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of
government contract funding essentially based on race and rejected prior decisions that presumed that
the federal government should be trusted to appropriately determine what constitutes “benign” racial
classifications without being subjected to the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
57. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). In Lyons, the Supreme Court refused to grant injunctive relief to Adolph
Lyons, a Black man, to bar the Los Angeles Police Department’s excessive and routine use of
chokeholds during traffic stops. See id. at 99–100.
58. See Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1 (1991) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
59. Id.
60. See Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C.
2001) (“According to the defendants, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law
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federal intervention into unconstitutional police practices61 and limits the DOJ to
seeking injunctive and equitable relief from the courts.62 Section 12601 does not
provide to private plaintiffs the authority to seek similar relief.63 The statutory
power to litigate the issue of unconstitutional pattern or practice policing rests
solely with the Attorney General as head of the DOJ.64
The absence of the private right of action was not merely an oversight. Indeed,
Congress rejected an earlier version of the bill, titled the Police Accountability
Act, that would have provided a private right of action and detailed measures
dedicated to police accountability.65 Congress initially aimed to give both the
Attorney General and injured individuals the right to seek remedies from police
departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.66 The
backlash to the proposed right of action for individual plaintiffs was swift.67
Opponents of the bill, including conservative lawmakers and police advocates,
voiced concerns about law enforcement agencies being subjected to frivolous
lawsuits from individuals characterized as likely to abuse the newfound authority.68 At least one article has proposed the notion that objectors were concerned
with more than protecting local governments from the cost and annoyance of frivolous lawsuits from community members.69 Marshall Miller proffers that lawmakers were concerned that rightful claims by injured individuals under the
proposed statute would essentially empower federal judges to make decisions
Enforcement Act of 1994 in response to the beating of Rodney King by members of the Los Angeles
Police Department.”).
61. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 31001,
108 Stat. 1796, 1877 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 6715 (2018)).
The Attorney General may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United
States against a unit of general local government that the Attorney General has reason to
believe has engaged or is engaging in a pattern or practice in violation of section 6711(a) or
(b). The court may grant—
(1) a temporary restraining order;
(2) an injunction; or
(3) an appropriate order to ensure enjoyment of rights under section 6711(a) or (b), including an order suspending, terminating, or requiring repayment of, payments under this
chapter or placing additional payments under this chapter in escrow pending the outcome of the action.
Id.
62. See id.
63. 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2018).
64. See id.
65. Police Accountability Act of 1991, H.R. 2972, 102d Cong. § 2(a)(3) (1991). This bill was never
adopted by Congress. Gilles, supra note 43, at 1403 (citing Joan Biskupic, Crime Measure Is a Casualty
of Partisan Skirmishing, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3528, 3528–30 (1991)).
66. See id.
67. Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 174–75 (1998).
68. See Gilles, supra note 43, at 1403 (quoting “a letter from Assistant Attorney General W. Lee
Rawls to Representative Henry Hyde” addressing the expense and time that local governments and
agencies would expend defending against pattern or practice lawsuits if individuals were granted
statutory authority to commence such litigation).
69. See Miller, supra note 67, at 175.
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about the manner in which police departments are run, a role he seems to believe
lawmakers wanted to leave to the elected and appointed officials in charge of
local governments.70 This concern, in many ways, echoed that of the U.S.
Supreme Court.71 The individual right of action was removed from the draft bill
in an effort to accommodate the stated objections.
Ultimately, the Police Accountability Act never advanced out of committee.72
The authority of the Attorney General to pursue pattern or practice litigation
against offending police departments was included instead in the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.73 It was enacted by Congress without
any authority for individuals to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief on their
own behalf. There is no mechanism by which aggrieved individuals or organizations could assert an interest and seek to secure a remedy.74
Research by Myriam Gilles aptly points out that the absence of an individual
private right to seek remedies for alleged unconstitutional government conduct is
in some ways unique to police misconduct. Her work details how individuals
have successfully challenged school segregation, environmental hazards, housing
discrimination, legislative reapportionment, and antitrust violations.75 The federal
government has indeed relied on private individuals to be “eyes on the ground” to
enforce the law through private actions in these other areas.76 The DOJ under the
Obama Administration looked for a way to include community perspectives in
the reform efforts initiated under the authority of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. As Part II discusses, those efforts have taken the
form of outreach and engagement, but concerns abound.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY INPUT IN DOJ INVESTIGATIONS AND REFORM
EFFORTS

Some may ask whether it is appropriate for communities impacted by police
abuses to have a role in pattern or practice litigation initiated by the DOJ. After
all, the controlling statute gives sole authority to bring suit to the federal government through the Attorney General.77 This perspective ignores the integral value
70. Id.
71. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (rejecting the lower court’s finding of federal
judicial power to supervise police department functioning).
72. Gilles, supra note 43, at 1403 (citing Joan Biskupic, Crime Measure Is a Casualty of Partisan
Skirmishing, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3528, 3528–30 (1991)).
73. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 31001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1877 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 6715 (2018)).
74. See Cover, supra note 43, at 379.
75. Gilles, supra note 43, at 1391 n.25, 1412, 1429–30; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (providing a
private right of action for any person injured by an antitrust violation); Hardin v. Ky. Utils. Co., 390 U.S.
1, 6 (1968) (“[W]hen the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to
protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing to require compliance with that
provision.”).
76. Gilles, supra note 43, at 1413; accord id. at 1386, 1413 (discussing the sweeping structural
reforms brought about through private litigants seeking to remedy constitutional violations in, among
other things, education, prison conditions, and abortion access). In this way, private litigants have filled
the gap when the federal government has failed to act.
77. 34 U.S.C. § 12601(b) (2018).
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of community input and engagement, which is widely recognized by the DOJ
(at least during the Obama Administration) and law enforcement.78 To that
end, the federal government has committed significant resources to the effort
of reforming unconstitutional police practices.79 Those resources have been
devoted to a myriad of activities, including engaging community leaders and
others impacted by police violence in response to their requests to investigate the patterns and practices of police departments.80 This is a considerable evolution from early consent decree processes that included minimal, if
any, community engagement efforts. More recent DOJ-initiated consent
decrees demonstrate that progress has been made toward an understanding
that community engagement and the establishment of positive community–
police relations are essential components to successfully reforming police
departments. 81
The DOJ has gradually increased outreach to the community and integration of
it into federal police reform efforts. Understanding the continuum of those
engagement efforts is essential to identifying potential ways to improve. This
Section explores the progression of those engagement efforts. First, it details the
cursory nature of community engagement provisions within DOJ-initiated consent decrees during the early years. Second, it explores the community engagement model employed by the DOJ during the next phase of consent decrees. It
uses the New Orleans consent decree to illustrate the expanded nature of community engagement requirements during that time. Finally, it examines the use of
community police commissions as the most recent DOJ approach to engage the
community in its police reform efforts.
1. First Wave—Cursory Community Engagement
Settlement agreements initially reached after the passage of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 contained only cursory statements

78. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE POLICE
REFORM WORK: 1994–PRESENT, at 13–14 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download
[https://perma.cc/B2AQ-27GL] (explaining that the evidence that the Civil Rights Division gathers from
communities affected by police misconduct plays a critical role in federal pattern or practice
investigations); TRENT IKERD & SAMUEL WALKER, DOJ OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.,
MAKING POLICE REFORMS ENDURE: THE KEYS FOR SUCCESS 25 (2010), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/
Publications/cops-p176-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XVD-URHM] (identifying community involvement
as an essential component to organizational change in police departments); see also Kami Chavis
Simmons, Stakeholder Participation in the Selection and Recruitment of Police: Democracy in Action,
32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 18–19 (2012) (discussing how the lack of community involvement
undermines the legitimacy and sustainability of federal police reform efforts).
79. See DOJ OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS PATTERNS OR PRACTICES OF POLICE MISCONDUCT AND PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY REFORM TO POLICE DEPARTMENTS 5 (2018), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/
a1814.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B7F-LR7C] (noting that the DOJ Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation
Section spent approximately $6.7 million in costs related to pattern or practice enforcement in 2016).
80. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78.
81. Id. at 40.
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requiring the subject police departments to engage with the community.82 A
review of settlement agreements over the years illustrates a marked change.
The Clinton Administration pursued its first pattern or practice suit to remedy
alleged unconstitutional policing in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The 1997 courtordered reform efforts between the United States and the City of Pittsburgh consisted of eighty-three paragraphs, only two of which addressed “Community
Relationships.”83 Those references acknowledged that the officer representative
attended community meetings within their assigned zones and that the Office of
Municipal Investigations, the entity required to investigate complaints against the
police, performed outreach to inform the community of its purpose.84 The paragraphs simply required the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police to continue its current
practices of attending community meetings and producing television broadcasts
(as well as using other means of outreach) to inform the public of the function
and complaint process employed by the Office of Municipal Investigations.85
The Pittsburgh consent decree required the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police to do
nothing more than what it had already been doing. The consent decree did not
contain any information on the desired goal to be achieved through these
mandates. For example, the decree could have required the Pittsburgh
Bureau of Police to analyze the data gathered from civilian complaints to
inform its policies or gauge the effectiveness of its community outreach
efforts. The decree could have also required the Bureau to incorporate into
its policies and training any insight or feedback it may have gained from
community meetings.
The Los Angeles consent decree filed four years later took minimal steps toward including issues relevant to that community.86 Like the Pittsburgh decree
before it, the Los Angeles decree required the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) to meet periodically with community advisory groups.87 There was no
requirement that the LAPD incorporate community input into the mandated
reforms. The Los Angeles decree did include more prescriptive requirements for
the LAPD related to community engagement. These requirements included distributing to community groups and centers forms needed to file a complaint;88
ensuring that Field Training and Gang Unit officers demonstrate proficiency in
“cultural and community sensitivity”;89 and providing training to all officers on
82. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 19–20, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 2:97-cv-00354-RJC
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1997), No. PN-PA-003-002. By contrast, the Steubenville consent decree ordered the
same year had only one reference to community. See Consent Decree at 7, United States v. City of
Steubenville, No. 2:97-CV-966 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 1997), No. PN-OH-002-005. That reference was
not related to officer engagement or accountability. Id.
83. See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, supra note 82.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (No.
2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC), ECF No. 123.
87. See id. at 73.
88. Id. at 30.
89. Id. at 47, 56.

2021]

CREATING SPACE FOR COMMUNITY REPRESENTATION

537

community policing and cultural diversity.90 Perhaps the most significant provision related to community involvement in the Los Angeles consent decree was
the creation of a program dedicated to “Community Outreach and Public
Information.”91 This mandate prescribed the frequency and manner by which the
LAPD had to provide the community with details about the consent decree and
how community members could file complaints alleging officer misconduct.92
The decree, however, failed to include any requirement that the LAPD collaborate or coordinate with community groups while carrying out its mandates.
Detroit was the next city to execute a consent decree to reform its police
department with the federal government. If the progressive nature of policerelated consent decrees can be measured by the number of ways that departments
are required to engage, consult, and inform the communities they serve, the
Detroit consent decree took a step backward. Like the Los Angeles and Pittsburgh
decrees, it required Detroit to perform outreach to the community to ensure civilians were aware of (and had forms for) the civilian complaint process.93 The
Detroit Police Department was also required to provide its “proposed policy revisions to the community.”94 However, the decree failed to include any requirement
that the Detroit Police Department solicit and incorporate recommendations from
the community, as appropriate, into those proposed policy revisions. The final reference to community in the Detroit decree required that officers participate annually in training on topics related to the Fourth Amendment such as probable cause,
arrests, and custodial detention.95
2. Second Wave—More Detailed Community Engagement
The next iteration of DOJ-initiated police consent decrees—which began in
2011 under the Obama Administration—involved an increased scope and depth
of outreach to communities impacted by police misconduct and violence.96 This
90. Id. at 56–57.
91. Id. at 72.
92. Id.
93. See Consent Judgment at 18–19, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG
(E.D. Mich. June 12, 2003), ECF No. 22.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id. at 35–36.
96. The DOJ entered into its first consent decree under the Obama Administration in United States v.
Territory of the Virgin Islands. See Consent Decree, United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, No.
3:08-cv-00158-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Mar. 24, 2009), ECF No. 3; see also DOJ C IVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra
note 78, at 43–44 (detailing the timeline of the investigation and consent decree). The underlying pattern
or practice investigation took place prior to former President Obama’s election, and the parties signed
the agreement in March 2009. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 43–44. It should come as
no surprise that the Virgin Islands consent decree mirrors the first wave of consent decrees, particularly
in the minimal ways that the provisions of the decree sought to expressly involve community. See
Consent Decree, supra, at 8.
It is worth acknowledging that the DOJ likely has a broad view of community in this context. Its
engagement efforts sought to include a cross section of representatives from diverse backgrounds and
experiences. This is no small effort and deserves recognition. This all-encompassing approach, however,
fails to recognize the critical importance of including in the litigation specific segments of the
community that have been disproportionately impacted by police violence.
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change was demonstrated in two ways. The first was the manner in which the
DOJ described the importance of community involvement in its efforts to reform
police misconduct in both its stand-alone reports and findings letters. A published
report by the DOJ identified restoring public trust as a specific aim of its pattern
or practice reform efforts.97 Community engagement became seen as integral to
improving police–community relations as well as accountability of officers.98
This recognition of the importance of community can also be gleaned from DOJ
findings letters detailing the scope and frequency of DOJ’s efforts to interview
community leaders and organizers throughout the process of making departmental findings.99 The second demonstration of increased scope and depth of outreach
can be found in the terms of negotiated settlement agreements reached between
2012 and 2015.100
The decree between the City of New Orleans and the federal government101 is
illustrative of both the growth in and limitations of efforts to include impacted
communities in police reform efforts. The sheer number of references to community in the New Orleans agreement increased more than twentyfold in comparison
to the first wave of consent decrees.102 The decree included provisions that the
New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) would (1) work with community advocates to distribute police policies related to immigration status103 and (2) build
relationships with community organizations for the purpose of ensuring that language services would be available to community members who speak Spanish or
Vietnamese.104 It also required the NOPD to include community mental health
professionals in its crisis intervention work.105

97. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 1, 4.
98. Id. at 29.
99. See, e.g., DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT 4 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/7XC7W25H]; DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE W. DIST. OF WASH.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCT8-EPTL]; Letter from
Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. & Amanda
Marshall, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of Or., to Sam Adams, Mayor, City of
Portland 4 (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/469399 [https://perma.cc/
G9GJ-EFZ2]; Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
Civil Rights Div. & Damon P. Martinez, Acting U.S Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of
N.M., to Richard J. Berry, Mayor, City of Albuquerque 2 (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/10/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q453-6XCX].
100. See Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV,
2015 WL 13747185 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2015), ECF No. 9-1; Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(2), United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265-SI, 2013 WL 12309780 (D. Or.
Feb. 19, 2013), ECF No. 4-1; Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, United
States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW, 2012 WL 12990388 (E.D. La. Aug. 31,
2012), ECF No. 159-1.
101. Consent Decree, United States v. City of New Orleans, supra note 100.
102. Compare id., with Consent Decree, United States v. City of Steubenville, supra note 82.
103. Id. at 50.
104. Id. at 52.
105. Id. at 35.
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3. Third Wave—Community Police Commissions
As detailed above, community feedback and input have been sought, in some
form, through DOJ-initiated consent decrees. The City of Seattle and the DOJ utilized a new model of community engagement in their 2012 agreement to reform
the city’s police department.106 For the first time, a DOJ-initiated consent
decree required a local jurisdiction to create a stakeholder group comprised of
community representatives from the many diverse communities within Seattle.
Credit allocation for the creation of the Seattle Community Police Commission
(CPC) was a point of contention among the parties.107 Motivation to create the
CPC may have been driven, in part, by questions of sustainability that have
dogged federal interventions in local police departments where a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional policing has been found.108 The Seattle consent
decree stressed the vital importance of input from the community on proposed
changes:
The community is a critical resource. Certain aspects of the reform efforts
embodied in the Agreements are best developed by dialogue and wide-spread
input. Moreover, ongoing community input into the development of reforms,
the establishment of police priorities, and mechanisms to promote community
confidence in SPD will strengthen SPD and facilitate police/community relationships necessary to promote public safety.109

The Cleveland consent decree also created a CPC as a “formal” mechanism to
“promote public trust and confidence . . . constitutional and effective policing, officer and public safety, and the sustainability of reforms.”110
As detailed above, the DOJ is on record as being committed to incorporating
community input into the fact-gathering phase and during the negotiation of
106. See Settlement Agreement & Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at 2–4, United States v.
City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), ECF No. 3-1.
107. See Letter from Jenny A. Durkan, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of
Wash. & Jonathan Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., to Cmty.
Police Comm’n (Oct. 21, 2013); Letter from Mike McGinn, Mayor of Seattle, to Cmty. Police Comm’n
1, 3 (Oct. 23, 2013) (detailing Mayor McGinn’s “recollection of the course of negotiations” in which the
DOJ credited the Mayor for the idea of the CPC); Jim Brunner, McGinn Seeks to Set Record Straight
After DOJ Criticism, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 24, 2013, 9:31 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/mcginn-seeks-to-set-record-straight-after-doj-criticism. In a letter from the DOJ to the CPC, the
DOJ provided the federal government’s account of its efforts to engage Seattle community members.
The letter detailed moments in the negotiation when the process stalled as it related to a number of
topics, including community engagement, and stated that the DOJ proposed that the agreement include a
“Community Monitoring Board.” Letter from Jenny A. Durkan, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the W. Dist. of Wash. & Jonathan Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil
Rights Div., to Cmty. Police Comm’n, supra. The letter goes on to clarify that Seattle had a role in
creating what became known as the CPC and asserts that the DOJ never stalled the process out of
concern that the community was involved. Id. at 2.
108. DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 18, 23–24.
109. Settlement Agreement & Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, supra note 106, at 2.
110. Settlement Agreement at 4, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046-SO (N.D.
Ohio May 26, 2015), ECF No. 7-1.
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settlement terms. The importance of community input and engagement, however,
appears to wane during the implementation phase of the reform efforts.
Specifically, the DOJ has opposed efforts by community organizations and leaders to be included as parties to the underlying litigation driving the reform
efforts.111 This is true despite acknowledgement by the DOJ that community
involvement is essential to the sustainability of reform efforts112 and that the failures of prior efforts have generated deep distrust of governmental authority
within certain communities.113
This evolution provides context and illustrates how current practices still fall
short of meaningful inclusion. Outreach and engagement are distinctly different
from the inclusion that party status can provide. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24 was created to provide that type of inclusion. Rule 24, however, has been utilized to no avail by impacted individuals and community organizations representing their interests. The next Part discusses the creation, purpose, and other issues
relevant to Rule 24.
II. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 24
Intervention attempts to serve as a mechanism to transform societal issues are
not new to public law litigation.114 The reform cases initiated by the DOJ are currently designed and purportedly used to resolve a significant and pressing societal
ill without any actual representation from members of the public thereby
impacted. The federal courts have refused to recognize the unique set of interests
shared by communities impacted by police abuses. The perspective, insight, and
experiences that shape those interests could prove indispensable to the law reform
process. Judicial decisions that fail to account for the unique interests of impacted
communities can result in the denial of opportunity to meaningfully participate in
reform litigation and have done so in a manner that frustrates the intent and purpose of Rule 24(a). This Part discusses the history of Rule 24 and the court decisions that drove its promulgation. It also explores the relevant issues of standing
and adequate representation. This Part concludes with a brief description of the
interplay between the Rule in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
111. See, e.g., United States’ Opposition to Motion to Intervene by Disability Rights New Mexico,
ACLU of New Mexico, & Native American Voters Alliance Education Project, United States v. City of
Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV (D.N.M. Apr. 22, 2015), ECF No. 120; Memorandum in
Opposition to Proposed Intervenor-Defendant Portland Police Ass’n & Proposed Intervenor-Plaintiff
AMA Coalition’s FRCP 24 Motions to Intervene, United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265SI, 2013 WL 12309780 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2013), ECF No. 25; United States’ Response to the Detroit
Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Motion for Intervention as of Right, United States v. City of Detroit,
No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2003), ECF No. 14.
112. DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 2, 18, 30.
113. Id. at 13. Undoubtedly, there are many more layers of governmental failures that contribute to
this distrust. Some of those are explored infra Section IV.B.3.
114. See Justin P. Gunter, Dual Standards for Third-Party Intervenors: Distinguishing Between
Public-Law and Private-Law Intervention, 66 VAND. L. REV. 645, 648–49 (2013) (discussing the
development of public law and its reliance on the federal judiciary to enforce the “social reform” goals
of the public law through litigation).
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affirmative action cases to demonstrate how the Rule has been applied in nonpolice reform cases.
A. HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE 24

The federal procedural rule that permits an unnamed party to join a lawsuit115
was originally adopted in 1938.116 The introduction of the concept was initially
viewed as contradictory to traditions that viewed plaintiffs as the “master of the
suit.”117 A derivative of Equity Rule 37,118 Rule 24 was designed to give to interested individuals the ability to assert a right in the litigation.119 But unlike its
predecessor, the new rule did not require the intervening interest to be subordinate to the original lawsuit.120
Rule 24 has undergone only one significant amendment since its original adoption.121 That revision occurred in 1966. At that time, the Advisory Committee recommended that parties entitled to intervention as a matter of right under
subdivision (a) of the Rule be redefined. The amendment resulted in a number of
revised provisions aimed at adjusting the manner in which courts applied the
Rule.122 As it relates to the changes in the text, the provision reduced what had
been two separate clauses into one clause.123 It also removed language that indicated the interest in question had to be property related.124 The two remaining
revisions were designed to address concerns about the ways courts placed additional hurdles in the path of movants seeking to intervene.125
Under the prior Rule 24(a), successful intervenors were required to demonstrate that their interests were inadequately represented and that they would be
legally bound by the outcome as a result of res judicata.126 The U.S. Supreme

115. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)–(b).
116. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1903
(3d ed. 2020).
117. Gunter, supra note 114, at 647–48 (quoting FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &
JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 626 (5th ed. 2001)).
118. The former Equity Rule 37 provided that “[a]nyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at
any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to,
and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding.” 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116,
§ 1903 n.2; see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912 (1987) (discussing how the events and
individuals responsible for the adoption of the Federal Rules were champions of equity as opposed to
adherents of the common law).
119. John E. Kennedy, Let’s All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329, 331–
32 (1969).
120. 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116.
121. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s notes to 1946, 1948, 1963, 1966, 1987, 1991, 2006,
and 2007 amendments.
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 21 (1951) (quoting prior Rule 24(a)—“when
the representation of the applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action” (emphasis added)—in its holding that the
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Court’s decision in Hansberry v. Lee revealed the insurmountable challenge that
those two requirements posed for potential litigants.127 Carl Hansberry and other
similarly situated Black landowners appealed a prior decision from the Illinois
Supreme Court.128 The land they purchased was purportedly subject to a restrictive covenant barring them from ownership because of their race.129 In affirming
the decision of the lower court, the Illinois Supreme Court held that litigation
aimed at adjudicating the validity of the restrictive covenants was barred by res
judicata, despite Mr. Hansberry not being a party to the prior suit.130
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the prior decision and held that class action
judgments were invalid against a nonparty that was not adequately represented.131
But recall that the prior rule of intervention required a movant to demonstrate that
it was both inadequately represented and bound by a prior judgment.132 What
Hansberry v. Lee resolved for the petitioners in that case created an impossible
conundrum for future litigants.133
Rule 24 was amended to replace the “formal, legalistic restrictions” with
“pragmatic solutions that guarantee fairness and orderly procedure.”134 The removal of the res judicata bar from the current version sought to achieve that goal.
The Rule, as amended, set forth a more liberal test than its predecessor.135 A movant is now required to show (1) an interest in the subject of the litigation, (2) a
lack of adequate representation of that interest by the existing parties, and (3) that
the outcome of the case may impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect that
interest.136 Despite the amendment to the Rule and recognition that the res judicata requirement created an unreasonable bar to intervention, courts have substituted that requirement with a strict reading of the third factor.
It is important to understand the context and purpose of Rule 24 beyond the
Advisory Committee’s notes and relevant scholarship during that time. Scholars
view the Supreme Court’s decision in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States137
adverse interests of the movant–intervenor were not barred by res judicata, and denying his motion to
intervene).
127. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Although Hansberry is commonly referred to in the class action context, it
would be a mistake not to recognize its impact on the rule of intervention. This is because the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on joinder, intervention, and class actions were revised to maintain symmetry
across all three. See Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and
Relevance Today, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 342–47 (2017) (discussing the deliberations of the Rules
Committee as it related to res judicata and Hansberry).
128. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37–38.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 38.
131. Id. at 45–46.
132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
133. See Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691–92 (1961); see also Kennedy,
supra note 119, at 350 (explaining that Hansberry created “a logical impossibility on the face of Rule
24 (a) (2) in that the conjunctive requirements of inadequate representation and binding effect could be
considered to be mutually exclusive”).
134. Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1229 (1966).
135. Coleman Capital Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 43 F.R.D. 407, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
137. 366 U.S. 683.
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as a catalyst for the Rule’s amendment.138 The underlying case in Sam Fox
involved a government antitrust action under the Sherman Act against the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP).139 The
proposed intervenor, Sam Fox, was a small-sized publisher concerned that
the reforms provided under the ASCAP consent decree were insufficient to
protect his interests and that the representation provided was inadequate to
serve those interests. 140 The parties agreed to terms in the decree that
required the ASCAP board to be elected by membership vote and for revenue distributions to be made on an equitable basis.141 The government
sought to modify the decree twice out of concern for “‘democratic administration of’ [ASCAP’s internal affairs] and for an equitable distribution
of . . . revenues.” 142
It was at this point in the twenty-year litigation process that Sam Fox
and a small group of publishers sought to intervene.143 Justice Harlan’s
opinion affirming the denial of intervention reportedly drew concern from
lower courts and scholars. 144 That concern was rooted in the notion that
movant–intervenors were left with no viable recourse. Rule 24(a)(2), as
interpreted by the Court, meant that intervention of right was not available
if the representation was inadequate because that would render the judgment defective and not binding, thereby not meeting the res judicata
requirement necessary for intervention.145 Satisfactory representation also
precluded intervention.146 It was this dilemma, along with efforts to maintain continuity across rules, that drove the lone substantive amendment to
Rule 24.147
As discussed above, Rule 24 has its historical underpinning in equity. The
1966 amendment to the Rule aimed to solidify Rule 24(a)(2)’s purpose—to provide access to the courts for those who had a broadly conceived legal interest and
met the remaining requirements of the Rule.148 This was done with the goal of
promulgating a liberal intervention standard.149 Satisfying the remaining requirements stated in the Rule can be a significant hurdle for those seeking
138. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 402–03 (1967).
139. Sam Fox, 366 U.S. at 685.
140. Kaplan, supra note 138, at 402.
141. Sam Fox, 366 U.S. at 686–87.
142. Id. at 687 (quoting the modified consent decree).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153, 156 (9th Cir. 1964); Atl. Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,
304 F.2d 387, 393–94 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Int’l Mortg. & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 861 (2d
Cir. 1962) (applying a practical test for the “is or may be bound” standard); John W. Stack, Comment,
Intervention of Right in Class Actions: The Dilemma of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), 50
CALIF. L. REV. 89, 91–92 (1962).
145. Kaplan, supra note 138, at 401–02.
146. Id. at 402.
147. See id. at 403.
148. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
149. Kaplan, supra note 138, at 403.
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intervention.150 As discussed below, existing parties have introduced the issue of
standing as a possible bar to intervention in some instances.151 The following
Sections briefly discuss how standing and adequate representation can impact
third-party intervention.
B. FEDERAL RULE 24 AND STANDING

In Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., the Supreme Court considered
whether a putative intervenor must have standing to intervene as a matter of
right.152 There was disagreement across federal circuit courts on that issue prior
to the decision in Laroe Estates.153 Some circuits held that putative intervenors
met the standing requirement provided that standing existed for the original party
on the same side of the litigation.154 Others held that the party seeking intervention must have independent standing to properly seek intervention.155
Laroe Estates provided some resolution to the circuit split on the issue of
standing. The putative intervenor, Laroe Estates, paid significant money as an
investment in plaintiff Sherman’s real estate project.156 Laroe Estates argued that
it was the equitable owner of the property and sought damages in its name.157 The
Court unanimously held that a movant–intervenor is required to satisfy standing
requirements if it seeks a remedy different from that of a party with standing.158
This recent decision leaves open the possibility that a putative intervenor is not
required to satisfy standing requirements when it seeks the same relief as an existing party. It is therefore reasonable, in the police reform litigation context, for a
movant–intervenor desiring injunctive relief similar to that of the federal government not to be required to satisfy standing requirements under Laroe Estates.
C. FEDERAL RULE 24 AND ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION 159

Rule 24(a) recognizes the rights of third parties to join existing litigation.160 To
intervene under Rule 24(a), a movant must show (1) an interest in the matter at
150. This Article focuses on the adequate representation factor of Rule 24(a). The remaining
requirements under the Rule are that the motion to intervene be timely and that it assert a significant
interest in the litigation that is likely to be impaired or impeded by the litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
151. See, e.g., Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003); Proof Brief for the United
States as Appellee at 14 & n.2, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-2343 (6th Cir. Apr. 7, 2004);
Defendant City of Albuquerque’s Response in Opposition to APOA’s Motion to Intervene at 14–15,
United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV, 2015 WL 13747185 (D.N.M. Feb.
19, 2015).
152. 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2017).
153. Id. at 1650.
154. E.g., San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007).
155. E.g., In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir.
2013).
156. Laroe Estates, 137 S. Ct. at 1649.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1648, 1651.
159. This is not to be confused with the requirements for class action certification under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a). A court, under that rule, must consider whether a named plaintiff is the
appropriate representative for a class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(4).
160. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
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hand, (2) that its interest may be impaired by the litigation, and (3) that its interest
is not adequately represented by an existing party.161
The extent to which a putative intervenor must show inadequate representation varies by circuit. Three circuits require only a minimum showing of inadequate representation. The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that an
intervenor needs only to point to “a potential for inadequate representation.”162 The Ninth Circuit uses a three-factor analysis to determine whether
existing representation is inadequate.163 It examines not only whether the
existing parties will undoubtedly make all of the proposed intervenor’s arguments but also if they are capable and willing to do so.164 The Ninth Circuit is
expressly concerned about the ability of a proposed intervenor to offer any
necessary elements to the proceedings that the existing parties would
neglect.165 The Tenth Circuit goes beyond a minimal showing requirement
and affirmatively rejects the presumption that the government adequately represents the interests of its citizens unless the interests are “identical.”166
Moreover, a presumption of identical interests can be successfully rebutted if
the government is obligated to consider interests different from those of the
intervenor.167
The majority of the remaining circuits’ presumption of adequate representation
analyses rely heavily on whether interests are aligned. A movant in one of these
other circuits must show something akin to its “interest [being] in fact different
from that of the [government] and that the interest will not be represented by [the
government].”168 The Fourth Circuit reasons that movants must make a strong

161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Davis v. Lifetime Capital, Inc., 560 F. App’x 477, 495 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also id. at 495–96 (“‘[I]t
may be enough to show that the existing party who purports to seek the same outcome will not make all
of the prospective intervenor’s arguments.’ ‘If the interest of the absent party is not represented at all, or
if all existing parties are adverse to the absent party, then she or he is not adequately represented.’” (first
quoting Grutter, 188 F.3d at 400; and then quoting Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir.
1989))).
163. See Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2011)
(detailing the Ninth Circuit’s three-factor adequacy of representation analysis: “(1) whether the interest
of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor’s arguments;
(2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed
intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect”
(quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003))).
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Kane County v. United States, 928 F.3d 877, 892 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bottoms v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1986)).
167. Id.
168. Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 662 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Edwards v. City of Houston,
78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)); see Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 888 F.3d 52, 60–61 (3d
Cir. 2018) (holding that a religious nonprofit made a compelling showing to intervene in a suit between
Pennsylvania and the United States over an exemption for religious businesses to pay for contraceptive
coverage); FTC v. Johnson, 800 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that there is a greater burden to
overcome the presumption of adequate representation when the court finds that interests are shared
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showing of governmental inadequacy because it presumes that government
agencies are best situated to defend the constitutionality of existing laws.169
A successful movant in the Seventh Circuit will effectively rebut the presumption of adequate governmental representation only by a showing of
“gross negligence or bad faith.”170
Part IV below discusses the adequate representation factor and the manner in
which courts have analyzed it when deciding motions to intervene filed on behalf
of community organizations in police pattern or practice litigation.171 That Part
also explores how those decisions, particularly those that assert the federal government adequately represents the interests of community organizations, have
run far afield from the amended purpose of Rule 24.
D. RULE 24 IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION CASES

Decisions in structural reform litigation regarding police practices have often
truncated the analysis when evaluating the interest of those asserting the right to
party status in the litigation on behalf of affected communities. No trial court decision in a police reform, consent decree case has ever granted a community
organization’s motion to intervene as a matter of right. The most success
achieved by a small few has been permissive intervention in one case and amici
status in others.172 But input from affected communities is an essential component
of the reform process aimed at remedying the effects of unconstitutional policing.173 The model used by the DOJ to elicit the community perspective through
newly created, hybrid commissions has been mostly frustrating and ineffective at
developing community voice with equal weight and authority in the process.174
More importantly, there are other areas within American law and government
that demonstrate how community and third-party input have been designed to
have more integrated roles.
Individuals who pursue employment discrimination redress through the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have intervened in enforcement
actions initiated by that federal agency. Though the Supreme Court has referred
to the EEOC as “the master of its own case,”175 individuals allegedly aggrieved
by an employer’s actions expressly retain the right to intervene in an action
between the movant and a governmental party (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. N. Little Rock Sch. Dist.,
378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2004)).
169. See Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that abortion providers could not
intervene to defend a constitutional challenge to abortion laws).
170. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ligas
ex rel. Foster v. Maram, 478 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2007)) (holding that the state legislature could not
intervene to defend a challenge to Wisconsin’s new abortion laws because they could not show that the
state attorney general would not provide adequate representation).
171. See infra Part IV.
172. See infra Part III.
173. DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 13.
174. See Betsy Graef, The Seattle Community Police Commission: Lessons Learned and
Considerations for Effective Community Involvement, 14 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 49–51 (2015).
175. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002).

2021]

CREATING SPACE FOR COMMUNITY REPRESENTATION

547

brought by the EEOC.176 The right of intervention initially created under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been codified by statute in the employment
discrimination context.177 The EEOC itself has recognized that employees may
need to intervene in litigation brought by the agency.178 This need exists because
“it is possible the Commission’s objectives and the [employee’s] interests will
diverge during the litigation.”179 The EEOC identifies its overall mission as the
pursuit of the public interest in correcting employment discrimination.180 The
agency recognizes that what it deems to be in the best interest of the general public may not be aligned with the specific interests of a singular aggrieved individual.181 The classification of who qualifies as an aggrieved party under the statute
has been broadly defined by some courts.182
Intervention attempts in affirmative action cases by putative intervenors
impacted by discrimination have been met with mixed judicial results.183 Black
employees, applicants, and contractors were granted the right to intervene in lawsuits that sought to undo affirmative action policies and ordinances.184
The same has not always held true in higher education affirmative action
cases.185 Circuit courts deciding those motions to intervene have diverged. In
Grutter v. Bollinger, a law school affirmative action case, the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged the right of intervention of community organizations as well as
interested, enrolled, and prospective African-American students.186 That court
was persuaded that the movant intervenors met all requirements of Rule 24(a)
and expressly rejected the presumption of adequate representation when government

176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2018).
177. See id.
178. E. Notice to Charging Parties of Commission Suits, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/manual/2-2-e_notice_to_cps.cfm [https://perma.cc/
2LF5-NG9D] (last visited Nov. 25, 2020).
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., EEOC v. Albertson’s LLC, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1347 (D. Colo. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff
who failed to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, but who asserts she was subject to similar
discrimination by the same actors during the same time frame as the charging parties, is an ‘aggrieved
person’ within the meaning of section 2000e-(f)(1).” (quoting EEOC v. Outback Steak House of Fla.,
Inc., 245 F.R.D. 657, 660 (D. Colo. 2007))).
183. See Danielle R. Holley, Narrative Highground: The Failure of Intervention as a Procedural
Device in Affirmative Action Litigation, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 111 (2003).
184. See Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the Defense
of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263, 267 n.15 (1999).
185. See id. at 266–67 (identifying cases in which students or organizations of color at the Boston
Latin Academy, the University of Texas Law School, and the University of Washington were not
granted the right to intervene in lawsuits challenging affirmative action policies at those institutions, but
identifying successful attempts by students and organizations of color to intervene in affirmative action
cases involving the University System of Georgia, the University of Maryland, and the University of
Michigan Law School).
186. 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1999).
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entities are a party to the action.187 The First Circuit, in Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, found that the minimal showing requires movant–intervenors to “produce ‘something more than
speculation as to the purported inadequacy’ of representation.”188 Unlike the successful intervenors in Grutter, the putative intervenors in Students for Fair
Admissions were required to demonstrate with some specificity how their interests would not be adequately represented.189
As detailed above, federal law provides to aggrieved employees the express
right to intervene in litigation commenced by the EEOC against an employer
deemed to have engaged in discriminatory practices. Likewise, some marginalized movant–intervenors have found success in utilizing Rule 24 to join affirmative action cases aimed at curtailing the consideration of race in admissions
policies by higher education institutions. Despite these mixed results, community
organizations seeking to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24 in federal
police reform cases have been met with unabashed rejection across all federal circuits. The following Part details the litigation efforts of those community
organizations.
III. EFFORTS BY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS TO ENGAGE IN POLICE REFORM
The presumption that a governmental authority can speak for marginalized
communities impacted by police violence promotes paternalistic, hierarchal principles that are antithetical to contemporary notions of democracy.190 Impacted
community members desire to have a voice that is heard and respected and that
affords to them self-governance in a similar fashion to those who are not marginalized. As discussed in greater detail below, those desires have been the subject
of motions to intervene in a number of jurisdictions involved in DOJ-initiated
reforms.
A. INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS REBUFFED BY FEDERAL
COURTS

Community organizations have attempted to gain party status in police reform
consent decrees191 under Rule 24 since the year 2000.192 Those attempts by

187. See id. at 400–01 (declining to impose a heightened requirement when a governmental entity is
a party, and citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972), and its
holding that only a minimal showing is needed to meet the inadequate representation requirement).
188. 807 F.3d 472, 475 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S. G. Phillips Corp., 610
F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1979)).
189. See id. at 476.
190. See Patel, supra note 39, at 805–06 (arguing that a direct correlation exists between
“[m]eaningful inclusion of directly impacted voices” and the fundamental democratic “principles of
self-determination, anti-subordination, and individual liberty”).
191. See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321
(1988), for a discussion and explanation of the distinct meaning of a consent decree—not a contract and
not a judgment—as well as an explanation of what typically occurs after a lawsuit is filed that leads to
the entering of a consent decree.
192. See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 396–97 (9th Cir. 2002).
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interested community organizations have continued in numerous jurisdictions
where the DOJ has found a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.193
And although the DOJ has highlighted its efforts to gain input from certain community stakeholders during both the investigative and settlement negotiation
stages,194 community leaders and organizations have reported feeling left out of
the negotiation and implementation phases of the reform process.195 Indeed, the
DOJ has formally opposed motions to intervene filed on behalf of community
organizations.196 The absence of formal inclusion and authority is of particular
concern considering that one of the central aims of the police structural reform
efforts led by the DOJ is to foster trust and improved relations between police
departments and the communities they serve.197
Building collaborative working relationships is essential to gaining valuable
insight into the experiences and needs of affected communities. This is no small
feat. A long history of abuse and distrust between affected communities and
police exists in the United States.198 This absence of trust undeniably adds to the
193. See infra Section III.B.
194. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 40.
195. See Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the
Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 525–26 (2008);
Civil Rights Organizations Demand Police Reform Documents from Justice Department, ACLU (Jan.
14, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/civil-rights-organizations-demand-police-reform-documentsjustice-department [https://perma.cc/3A8M-ZZJQ]; Jodi S. Cohen & Jennifer Smith Richards, Police
Oversight Ordinance Promised Transparency but Doesn’t Fully Deliver, CHI. TRIB. (Nov, 13, 2017, 6:50
AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-police-discipline-transparency-20171113-story.html;
Fighting Police Abuse: A Community Action Manual, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/fighting-policeabuse-community-action-manual [https://perma.cc/4JRQ-8D5D] (last visited Nov. 27, 2020); Jo Ann
Hardesty, Failure of Leadership, Lack of Accountability, in Police Contract, ST. ROOTS NEWS (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://news.streetroots.org/2016/10/13/failure-leadership-lack-accountability-police-contract [https://perma.cc/
KXU7-TQCD] (“All bodies, purportedly designed to gather public testimony on civil rights and policing, are
effectively suppressed.”).
196. See, e.g., United States’ Opposition to Motion to Intervene by Disability Rights New Mexico,
ACLU of New Mexico, & Native American Voters Alliance Education Project, supra note 111; United
States’ Combined Response to the CPC’s Motion to Partially Intervene & to the City & the CPC’s
Motions to Extend Certain Deadlines, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 5, 2013), ECF No. 96; Memorandum in Opposition to Proposed Intervenor-Defendant
Portland Police Ass’n & Proposed Intervenor-Plaintiff AMA Coalition’s FRCP 24 Motions to Intervene,
supra note 111.
197. DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 25.
198. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 & n.14 (1968); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 143–44 (1968); Sirry Alang, Donna McAlpine, Ellen McCreedy &
Rachel Hardeman, Police Brutality and Black Health: Setting the Agenda for Public Health Scholars,
107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 662, 662 (2017); Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los
Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
545, 570, 620 (2001); Hardaway, supra note 50, at 148; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43904, PUBLIC
TRUST AND LAW ENFORCEMENT—A DISCUSSION FOR POLICYMAKERS 1 (2018), https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43904/15 [https://perma.cc/A5EP-CRJF]; RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, A
REPORT TO THE LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS, POLICIES,
AND PROCEDURES OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT IN THE WAKE OF THE RAMPART SCANDAL 1
(2000), https://perma.cc/8PA9-G3DP; LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 1 (2001), https://perma.cc/L9C7-3437. See generally BERNARD C. PARKS, L.A. POLICE DEP’T,
BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPANT AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT: PUBLIC REPORT 287 (Mar. 1,
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difficulty of structural reform efforts.199 Fostering trust and positive relationships
under such circumstances cannot be achieved overnight or with a perfunctory
approach. A critical component of the effort to build better relationships is to create a reform process that the community views as valuable and likely to affect
positive, meaningful change.200 Community leaders and organizations have
expressed the importance of being present and heard when policy revisions and
community engagement plans are being made.201
But the desire for community leaders and organizations to be a part of the
reform process goes even further than policy revisions and recommendations.
Not being heard and seen in the process compounds the marginalization of
affected communities202 who have, in various ways over the years, unsuccessfully
sought relief from the judiciary or elected officials.203
Efforts by individuals to initiate structural reforms within problematic police
departments have historically been rebuffed by the federal courts and American
legislators. Lawsuits filed both pre- and post-Monell v. Department of Social
Services204 seeking structural improvements in response to police abuses
2000), http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/boi_pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLD9-LXSD] (discussing
corruption within the LAPD and its effect on the community).
199. See Simmons, supra note 195, at 524 (explaining reform processes with questionable legitimacy
run the risk of causing stakeholders to “become distrustful of federal intervention”).
200. See id. at 527 (discussing the essential function of positive relationships between police and
community partnerships in policies focused on community policing).
201. Id. at 525–26 (highlighting how the DOJ reform process involving the LAPD alienated
community groups who became distrustful of “‘secret’ negotiations”).
202. Kay E. Cook, Marginalized Populations, in 2 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH METHODS 495, 495 (Lisa M. Given ed., 2008) (“Marginalized populations are those excluded
from mainstream social, economic, cultural, or political life. Examples of marginalized populations
include, but are by no means limited to, groups excluded due to race, religion, political or cultural group,
age, gender, or financial status.”).
203. See, e.g., Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability & Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F.
Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This case involved two consolidated cases wherein Black plaintiffs alleged
widespread constitutional violations of their rights by the Philadelphia Police Department, including
specific officers as well as elected and appointed officials. Id. at 1290. The district court found that Black
community members and those critical of the police department were too often subjected to
unconstitutional conduct from officers, and the defendants were ordered to create a civilian complaint
process. See id. at 1321. Three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the district court
improperly “injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of” the police
department. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976).
Individuals may pursue police misconduct claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but not without significant
limitations. Proof that an officer injured or violated the rights of the individual plaintiff is not enough to
recover damages. Plaintiffs must first contend with claims that the officer’s conduct is barred from
liability on qualified immunity grounds. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (holding that
qualified immunity will bar recovery under a § 1983 claim unless the officer’s conduct violated a clearly
established constitutional right (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987))). A plaintiff
able to surpass that hurdle—and who wishes to sue the department, rather than the individual officer—
must also prove that the conduct was the result of departmental policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in City of Canton v. Harris interjected a “deliberate
indifference” standard that places another hurdle in the path of recovering against municipalities for
failing to properly train officers. 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).
204. 436 U.S. 658.
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committed by officers in Los Angeles and Philadelphia were ultimately rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held in Rizzo v. Goode that federalism and
equitable restraint principles precluded the trial court from granting injunctive
relief to individuals and community organizations in Philadelphia to address discriminatory police practices within that police department.205
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court denied efforts by Adolph Lyons to
enjoin officers in Los Angeles from using deadly chokeholds during interactions
with individuals who posed no threat to those officers.206 Mr. Lyons had been
strangled until he lost consciousness and control over his bladder and bowels during a traffic stop for a burned out taillight.207 After a volley of appeals disrupted a
series of short-lived alternating victories by Mr. Lyons and the City of Los
Angeles, the Supreme Court ultimately found that the past wrongs of LAPD officers failed to provide standing for Mr. Lyons to enjoin the future conduct of officers on the streets of that city.208 That ruling seemed to deliver a fatal blow to
individual efforts aimed at using injunctive relief to structurally change improper
police practices in order to improve the manner in which policing is delivered in
communities.209
It is with that backdrop that this Part discusses the formal attempts of community organizations to be included in structural litigation efforts to rectify
alleged unconstitutional policing and to provide meaningful input. Individuals
and community organizations have been engaged in efforts to remedy the
abuses suffered disproportionately by Black community members for several
decades. These efforts predate the passage of federal legislation aimed at rooting out pattern or practice violations by law enforcement. The following subsection provides the unique contribution of examining each of the seven
instances where community organizations have sought to intervene in DOJinitiated police consent decrees.
B. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS’ EFFORTS TO GAIN PARTY STATUS AFTER THE PASSAGE
OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994

Community organizations have attempted to intervene in seven of the total
twenty DOJ-initiated consent decrees210 aimed at reforming alleged pattern or
practice violations by law enforcement. Five of those seven sought intervention
205. See 423 U.S. at 380; Hardaway, supra note 50, at 155.
206. See 461 U.S. 95, 97–98, 111–12 (1983).
207. Id. at 114–15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. See id. at 111 (majority opinion).
209. This is not to ignore the private right of action that still exists for anyone to claim damages
against local police departments and individual officers as a result of any alleged unconstitutional
policing they may suffer.
210. See An Interactive Guide to the Civil Rights Division’s Police Reforms, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan.
18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/922456/download [https://perma.cc/MBY3-GCNF].
Note that the reform agreements counted here do not include all investigations or reform efforts that fell
short of official consent decrees. Instead, the twenty cases referenced here included only instances where
a suit initiated by the DOJ under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 resulted
in a federal consent decree.
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as a matter of right. Motions to intervene as a matter of right have been denied
and affirmed in all of those instances. The only time that a community organization has been allowed to intervene—albeit only permissively following an appeal
—was in United States v. City of Los Angeles,211 as discussed below. This
Section details the manner in which courts have analyzed community organizations’ motions to intervene filed in DOJ-initiated police pattern or practice
lawsuits.
1. Los Angeles
In United States v. City of Los Angeles, five community organizations and
impacted individuals collectively moved to intervene.212 The court noted that
these organizations worked for a number of years with impacted communities
and the LAPD on reform efforts.213 The community organizations identified their
motivation for intervention as centered around ensuring that the consent decreerelated reforms were successful as well as their ability to continue to participate
in reform efforts.214 The parties representing both the federal and municipal governments opposed intervention out of concern that allowing others into the litigation would slow down the progress of a complex negotiation process.215 The
court considered separately the questions of intervention as a matter of right and
permissive intervention.216
Intervention as a matter of right was characterized by the Ninth Circuit as
guided by practical and equitable considerations that fall in the favor of the proposed intervenors.217 The purpose of such purported liberal intervention is to
ensure four aims: (1) to promote efficiency, (2) to broaden access to courts, (3) to
prevent or simplify future cases, and (4) to allow “additional interested
part[ies] to express [their] views before the court.”218 Arguably, this liberal standard of guiding principles for determining intervention as a matter of right might
lead one to believe that most intervenors would gain party status with relative
ease. That has not been the case, and it is not what happened in United States v.
City of Los Angeles.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision denying the putative community intervenors’ motion for intervention as a matter of right for two
reasons. First, the court held that the movants failed to meet the impair or impede
requirement because the consent decree litigation did not bar individual plaintiffs
211. 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002).
212. See id. at 397. The organizations included the ACLU of Southern California, Asian Pacific
American Legal Center, Homeboy Industries, Radio Sin Fronteras, and Southern Christian Leadership
Conference of Los Angeles. Id. at 397 n.3.
213. See id. at 397.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 404.
216. See id. at 402–03.
217. See id. at 397.
218. Id. at 397–98 (quoting Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.8
(9th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
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from pursing their own action against the LAPD for unconstitutional policing nor
did it prevent the community organizations from ceasing efforts to reform the
department.219 Second, the court held that the movant community organizations
failed to successfully rebut the presumption that the federal government provided
adequate representation of their interests.220 Seeking strict enforcement of the
decree alone was not enough to demonstrate inadequate representation for the
Ninth Circuit. The opinion indicates that the movants needed to point to some
failing or dispute concerning the terms of the consent decree in order to be
granted intervention as a matter of right.221
2. Detroit
A motion to intervene filed by the Coalition Against Police Brutality was
denied in 2003 by the federal district court in Detroit.222 The Coalition consisted
mostly individuals impacted by violence during encounters with Detroit police
officers.223 The Coalition’s efforts to address unconstitutional policing in that city
date back to 1998.224 At that time, the organization presented a report to the
Detroit City Council during a hearing on the need for police reform.225 It was
reportedly the Coalition’s efforts, in collaboration with the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Amnesty International,
which contributed to the city’s decision to request a § 14141 investigation by the
DOJ four years later.226
The Coalition’s motion to intervene argued that its significant interests were
threefold: (1) representing its members, some of which had filed pending complaints against Detroit officers; (2) ensuring that “true reform” took place through
the DOJ process; and (3) making certain that existing community input from citizens and those impacted by police misconduct were not curtailed by the current
reform process.227
The Coalition pointed to the broad analysis employed by the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits when determining what constitutes a significant, protectable interest.228 The Coalition also cited a finding by the Fifth Circuit that the National
Organization of Women had a significant interest for purposes of intervention in
219. See id. at 402.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Order, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26,
2003), ECF No. 31 (denying motions to intervene).
223. Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Motion for Intervention as of Right at 2, City of Detroit,
No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2003), ECF No. 10.
224. Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Brief in Support of Their Motion for Intervention as of
Right at 5, City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2003), ECF No. 10 (citation
to internal record omitted).
225. Id. at 6.
226. Id. at 7.
227. See Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Motion for Intervention as of Right, supra note 223,
at 3.
228. See Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Brief in Support of Their Motion for Intervention as of
Right, supra note 224, at 8–9.
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an action filed by the federal government against steel employers for gender discrimination.229 The Coalition also pointed to a district court finding that the
NAACP in Los Angeles had a sufficient interest to intervene in an action filed by
contractors alleging that minority contracts set aside under the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977 were unconstitutional.230
As to whether the interests of the Coalition would be adequately represented or
protected by one of the existing parties, the Coalition argued that neither the City
of Detroit nor the DOJ was in a position to do so.231 The Coalition pointed to two
failings on the part of the existing parties. First, the City and the DOJ failed to
seek input from the organization regarding the proposed settlement prior to its filing.232 Second, the parties also failed to hold community meetings to understand
the perspective and concerns of community members.233
The City’s opposition to intervention asserted that those possible interests
were represented by both the federal government and the City of Detroit by way
of the elected city council.234 An upcoming city council meeting was identified as
the public’s opportunity for “[c]ommunity input and outreach.”235 The federal
government denied any impropriety in the negotiation of the agreement and
asserted the adequacy of its representation by virtue of the DOJ’s goal to “bring
about reform in the [Detroit Police Department] to stem the pattern and practice
of constitutional violations.”236
The filings by the putative intervenors and the City of Detroit presented issues
relevant to judicial consideration. Those issues included whether the government
should consult with impacted communities to adequately represent those

229. See id. at 9 (citing United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 845 (5th Cir.
1975)).
230. See id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Sec’y of Commerce, 459 F. Supp. 766,
771 (C.D. Cal. 1978)).
231. See id. at 11–13.
232. Id. at 11–12.
233. Id.
234. Respondent City of Detroit’s Response to Petitioner Coalition Against Police Brutality’s
Motion for Intervention as of Right at 2–3, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-ACDRG (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2003), ECF No. 17.
In a somewhat perplexing twist, the Detroit City Council had previously filed a motion to intervene
approximately three weeks prior to the Coalition’s filing. See Detroit City Council’s Motion to Intervene
at 2, 4–6, City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2003), ECF No. 6. The
Council’s motion to intervene asserted that, contrary to the city charter, the decision by the mayor and
Detroit Police Department to enter into the consent decree was made without the approval of Council.
See id. at 3. The Council also asserted a conflict of interest between it and the mayor because the mayor
stepped outside of his authority by appropriating funds to be spent on the decree. See id. at 5. The
Council also complained that it was unaware of the terms of the consent decree and that it had no input
on the selection of the monitor. See id. at 6. The motion by the Council called into question its ability to
represent the interests of the Coalition.
235. Respondent City of Detroit’s Response to Petitioner Coalition Against Police Brutality’s
Motion for Intervention as of Right, supra note 234, at 3.
236. United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Response to the Detroit Coalition Against
Police Brutality’s Motion for Intervention as of Right at 7, City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG
(E.D. Mich. July 10, 2003), ECF No. 14.
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communities and whether a general interest in a similar result is enough to satisfy
the adequate representation factor. The Coalition’s motion for intervention was
denied by the district court without written explanation.237
3. New Orleans
In New Orleans, the Community United for Change (CUC) sought to intervene238 in litigation related to a proposed consent decree.239 Procedurally, the
organization’s motion was timely. It was submitted just fourteen days after the
complaint and proposed consent decree were filed by the DOJ, and by the courtordered deadline for such motions.240 The CUC was described as “a non-profit
association of people in New Orleans who have done admirable work for decades
to transform the New Orleans Police Department [NOPD] into a constitutional
policing department that respects the rights of all residents.”241 The organization
reportedly “works with and on behalf of resident victims of the NOPD.”242 It was
CUC that made the initial request to the DOJ for an investigation into the conduct
of the NOPD.243 Similar to the efforts of community organizations in other cities,
CUC facilitated meetings for community members to detail their experiences and
concerns related to the NOPD.244 Representatives of the DOJ were reportedly in
attendance at some of those meetings.245
The CUC reform efforts did not begin with gaining the attention of the DOJ.
More than two years before the federal consent decree was approved by the
court, CUC reportedly compiled a “31 page Peoples [sic] Consent Decree”
detailing the reforms deemed necessary from the perspective of impacted
communities.246 According to CUC, its efforts to provide community input
through elected officials were rebuffed by the New Orleans City Council.247 The
CUC sought intervention because, in its view, “the remedies suggested in the proposed consent decree [were] too little and too weak and not at all likely to force the
major transformation needed” to ensure constitutional policing in New Orleans.248
The CUC’s filing in support of its intervention asserted that none of the existing parties “adequately represent[ed] the interests of the people who are the primary victims

237. See Order, supra note 222.
238. Louisiana state law also provides organizations like CUC the right to intervene: “An
unincorporated association, in its name, may institute, defend, intervene, or participate in a judicial,
administrative, or other governmental proceeding . . . .” LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:507(A) (2019).
239. See Motion to Intervene, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW,
2012 WL 12990388, (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012), ECF No. 11.
240. City of New Orleans, 2012 WL 12990388, at *6.
241. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Motion to Intervene, supra note 239, at 1).
242. Motion to Intervene, supra note 239, at 1.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 2.
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. Id. The Peoples Consent Decree was submitted to the Department of Justice. Id.
248. Id. at 5.
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of the culture of corruption pointed out by the DOJ.”249
The DOJ opposition focused on two points related to adequate representation.
First, it argued that CUC failed to rebut the presumption that a government entity
adequately represents the interests of “all of its citizens.”250 It further argued that
CUC was required to demonstrate that its interests were both different and not
adequately represented by the government.251 Second, the DOJ argued that CUC
could not overcome a second presumption of adequate representation recognized
by the Fifth Circuit because the federal government and CUC shared the same
goal of constitutional policing.252
In denying CUC’s motion to intervene, the district court employed a limited
reading of the legally protectable interest required under Rule 24(a). The opinion
of the court took issue with CUC’s interest in police reform not being based in a
contractual relationship or property right that could be impacted by the remedies
instituted through the litigation.253 The court’s interpretation of the legally protectable interest not only went beyond that required by Rule 24(a) but also diminished the importance of the interest that CUC asserted. It is difficult to reconcile
the notion that a community organization devoted to ensuring the constitutional
protections of impacted community members would not have a legally protectable interest in constitutional policing. Moreover, the expectation that CUC
would have a legally binding agreement or property right to aid in the protection
of those interests is contrary to the articulated equitable purpose of Rule 24 and is
misplaced in this context.254 To support its position, the court cited an oil and gas
pipeline case,255 a citation that demonstrates the court’s effort to fit a square peg
into a round hole as it relates to its application of the Rule 24(a) standard in the
context of police reform litigation.
Finally, the court held that, even if CUC did have a protectable interest, the
proposed consent decree process would not impair CUC’s ability to bring a separate action against officers for constitutional violations.256 This approach ignores
Supreme Court decisions that make it virtually impossible for individuals to successfully file suits to enjoin systemic police misconduct.257 The decision in this
case also fails to adhere to interests of judicial efficiency and frustrates the
249. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene at 4, United States v. City of New Orleans, No.
2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW, 2012 WL 12990388, (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012), ECF No. 11-1.
250. United States’ Memorandum in Response to Motions to Intervene at 17–18, City of New
Orleans, 2012 WL 12990388, ECF No. 27 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1994)).
251. Id. at 17.
252. Id. at 18.
253. City New Orleans, 2012 WL 12990388, at *6.
254. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (articulating a desire to
remove property interest as a fulcrum to interventions as a matter of right in the adopted 1966
amendment to Rule 24).
255. See City of New Orleans, 2012 WL 12990388, at *6 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984)).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379–80 (1976); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499–
502 (1974).
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general purpose of the rule of intervention.258 Moreover, the rationale of the court
ignores the unique opportunity that the federally initiated structural reform litigation presents. The court’s opinion did not specifically address whether the interests asserted by CUC were adequately represented by an existing party.
The New Orleans consent decree and those that came after it fail in some key
areas. From a practical standpoint, an analysis of the New Orleans decree reveals
several ways in which that project could have benefited from robust and inclusive
interfacing with CUC. For instance, the decree required the NOPD to ensure that
the stops, searches, and arrests it conducted would be “consistent with community
priorities for [law] enforcement.”259 It contains no direction on how any such priorities would be identified and incorporated into the reform process.
The decree also required the NOPD to provide police services that “promote[]
broad community engagement and confidence” in the police force.260 Although
this is a positive objective essential to building healthy relationships between the
police and the community they serve, the stated goal alone is not enough. Aside
from a requirement that the bias-free training include both community and police
perspectives on discriminatory policing,261 the decree provides no guidance or
opportunity for the community to provide insight on what type of interactions
could lead to greater confidence and engagement.
The absence of collaboration with impacted community organizations is particularly apparent in the Sections of the decree entitled “Community Engagement”262
and “Community-Based Restorative Justice Project.”263 In contrast to the portions
of the decree focused on victim-centered policing for those who have suffered
sexual or domestic violence,264 the Community Engagement and Restorative
Justice Project provisions are light on details. The Community Engagement
Section identifies no community organizations with which the department should
collaborate.265 Instead, the decree requires officers to continue to attend department258. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; Kaplan, supra note 138,
at 401.
259. Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, supra note 100, at 38.
260. Id. at 48.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 60.
263. Id. at 108.
264. Id. at 54–59.
265. See id. at 60–63. Contrast this with the fact that the Section on “Policing Free of Gender Bias”
requires NOPD to collaborate closely with victim-centered community organizations—specifically
the New Orleans Family Justice Center (NOFJC)—to make sure that the Department’s response to
sexual assaults and domestic violence incidents are free of gender bias and are a part of thorough
investigations. Id. at 54, 58. This is important, yet the decree only reinforces an already established
relationship between NOPD and NOFJC. The organization is estimated to receive sixty percent of its
funding from the federal government. Jacqueline Quynh, New Orleans Family Justice Center in
Jeopardy During Government Shutdown, 4WWL (Dec. 26, 2018, 7:29 PM), https://www.wwltv.com/
article/news/local/new-orleans-family-justice-center-in-jeopardy-during-government-shutdown /289ee1cfa8c-cc87-49e5-b7f7-21749ee8a261 [https://perma.cc/S6DK-ZXJV]. The organization also had
an existing relationship with the local prosecutor. Domestic Violence Unit Standard Operating
Guidelines, NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, https://www.nola.gov/getattachment/NOPD/Policies/
Domestic-Violence-Unit-Standard-Operating-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ8D-UYRM] (last
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sponsored community meetings.266 It fails to require the NOPD to collaborate with
community organizations that have demonstrated long-standing interest in ending
unconstitutional police violence. Instead, the decree narrowly requires the NOPD to
collaborate with the community to address issues related to “safety and quality of
life.”267
The Restorative Justice Project provision is even more devoid of information
and details than the Community Engagement section. The brief paragraph makes
the laudable acknowledgment that the parties need to create a project aimed at
“remedy[ing] mistrust between NOPD and the . . . community.”268 It contains no
information on how the project would be implemented, including who would
fund and run it.269
Granted, it would be impossible to include every detail on how the NOPD was
to go about fulfilling its obligations under the decree. That effort would require a
type of mystical foresight not seen in structural reform litigation. In large measure, the information provided fits the general spirit of consent decree settlement
agreements and can be viewed as a commitment of the parties to work collaboratively to accomplish the agreed-upon terms. However, the repeated amorphous
use of community hints at two glaring problems with the current approach to
DOJ-initiated police reforms.
The first is that the decree refuses to identify impacted communities as the segment of community with which the police and federal government should be collaborating. If the reform efforts exist to end unconstitutional policing and repair
the relationship between police and the affected communities, specifically naming that goal and identifying the organizations working toward the same goal
should be required. The second glaring problem is the failure of the decree to specifically require the police to work in concrete, measurable, and verifiable ways
with organizations representing impacted communities. Without the community
at the table during the formative phases of plans designed to repair police–
community relationships and increase officer accountability, the DOJ and federal
court simply required the NOPD to have a one-sided conversation.

visited Dec. 1, 2020). At best, this mandate attempts to strengthen an existing positive relationship. It
does not do anything to reform or establish non-existing relationships between the police and the
communities impacted by police violence. This decree mandate specifically protects the federal government
interest in the federal funds it provided to NOFJC. The New Orleans Police Department and Gender-Biased
Policing, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/neworleans-police-department-and-gender-biased-policing [https://perma.cc/4MFX-7S4S]. Provisions related to
NOFJC and fortifying its relationship with NOPD span six pages of the decree. See Consent Decree
Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, supra note 100, at 54–60.
266. See Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, supra note 100, at 61. The
consent decree references New Orleans Neighbors and Police Anti-Crime Council (NONPACC)
meetings, see id., which are found on the New Orleans Police Department Event Calendar, see NOPD
Event Calendar, CITY NEW ORLEANS, https://www.nola.gov/nopd/calendar/ (click the button with a
right arrow until NONPACC meetings appear in the “Event” column).
267. See Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, supra note 100, at 61.
268. Id. at 108.
269. See id.
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4. Portland
The Albina Ministerial Alliance Coalition for Justice and Police Reform
(AMA) filed a motion to intervene as of right in the DOJ pattern or practice suit
in Portland, Oregon in January 2013.270 The AMA began ten years prior, after the
shooting of Kendra James, a Black woman, by Portland police during a traffic
stop.271 The AMA comprised 125 Portland-area religious congregations.272 Those
groups had been working in the area of social justice for more than four decades
and were founding members of the AMA.273
The AMA made several solicited recommendations regarding the draft terms
of a proposed settlement agreement.274 Those recommendations were not limited
solely to aspects of traditional community engagement. The organization raised
concerns and declared interests regarding data tracking, the use of intermediary
weapons, and the expansion of police accountability through community oversight.275 The AMA argued that the finalized agreement failed to address the
organization’s interests on those issues and others.276
The AMA also squarely addressed its assertion that the DOJ would not
adequately represent its interests in two ways. First, the organization stated its
concern about the failure of the DOJ to address the racially discriminatory practices of the Portland Police Bureau.277 Community organization leaders provided
data analysis on the disparate use of force based on race.278 The DOJ, despite a
purported recognition of the disparity, failed to ensure that the settlement terms
were designed to remedy the issue.279 Second, the organization argued that the
DOJ would not adequately represent its interests because the DOJ had rejected
recommendations on accountability, use of force, data tracking, and ongoing
community input or court oversight of outcomes.280
The DOJ argued that it adequately represented any interests that AMA had
in the current litigation. It addressed two presumptions of adequate representation
that it argued AMA failed to rebut: the presumption that arises when the intervenor has the same “ultimate objective” of one of the parties, and the presumption
that the government adequately represents the interests of its constituency.281

270. See Memorandum of Law in Support of AMA Coalition’s Motion to Intervene at 1, United
States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265-SI, 2013 WL 12309780 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2013), ECF No.
20.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 6–7.
275. See id. at 8.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 13–14.
278. Id. at 14.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 15.
281. Memorandum in Opposition to Proposed Intervenor-Defendant Portland Police Ass’n &
Proposed Intervenor-Plaintiff AMA Coalition’s FRCP 24 Motions to Intervene, supra note 111, at 19.
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The district court agreed with the DOJ.282 The court determined this after
detailing in the opinion how an interest is not protectable if it is “undifferentiated” and “generalized,” or if it is “comparable to a substantial portion of the population.”283 This analysis failed to address the racially disparate policing present
in American cities.284 People of color, especially Black people, experience disproportionately high rates of interactions with police—from traffic stops to physical violence.285 The concerns of individuals and communities directly impacted
by those disparities are distinctly different from those of the majority. The characterization of AMA’s interests as “undifferentiated” and “generalized” ignored
that reality and allowed the court to end its analysis without addressing the issue
of adequate representation.286 Consequently, the finding by the court that AMA
had no protectable interest created the space for it to avoid addressing the issue of
adequate representation.287
Nevertheless, the court provided its analysis of the adequate representation factor. It found that AMA could not overcome the presumption that the government
adequately represents its constituents.288 Embedded in the analysis is the court’s
assumption that the federal government was interested in remedying unconstitutional policing and therefore would adequately represent the interests of AMA.
For reasons more fully discussed in Part IV, this finding fails on at least two
fronts. First, the court failed to acknowledge that a proponent for a general resolution is quite different than an advocate for specified interests. Second, the finding
negated the value and insight that those closely connected to the relevant police
misconduct could add to inform the reform process.
5. Albuquerque
Formal intervention was sought in the Albuquerque federal consent decree on
two separate occasions. The first attempt involved motions of nine unrepresented
individuals filed prior to the fairness hearing held by the court to assess the

282. See City of Portland, 2013 WL 12309780, at *6.
283. Id. at *5 (quoting S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002)).
284. See Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy
Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, A
Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM.
BEHAV. 736, 739–41 (2020).
285. Id. at 739; see also Sarah DeGue, Katherine A. Fowler & Cynthia Calkins, Deaths Due to Use of
Lethal Force by Law Enforcement: Findings from the National Violent Death Reporting System, 17 U.S.
States, 2009–2012, 51 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S173, S176 (2016) (finding that members of the Black
community were overrepresented relative to the U.S. population as victims of police violence).
286. See City of Portland, 2013 WL 12309780, at *6.
287. The court granted to AMA what it referred to as “enhanced amicus curiae” status. Id. at *8. That
status certainly provides the appearance that AMA has a literal seat at the table by ordering that it be
permitted to: (1) provide briefs on any issues before the court in the same manner as the parties;
(2) participate in any oral arguments; (3) have a place at counsel’s table; and (4) be referred to as a party
in the litigation, among other concessions. Id. This raises the question of why the court would make
these concessions for an entity with no protectable interest that is being adequately represented by an
existing party.
288. Id. at *7.
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appropriateness of the proposed decree.289 The court observed that the motions
expressed a general interest in remedying “lawlessness” within the Albuquerque
Police Department.290 The court found that the interest was shared and adequately
represented by the DOJ.291 The first attempt at intervention by individuals within
the Albuquerque community was consequently denied.292
The second attempt at intervention involved three community groups representing the homeless, disabled, and Native American communities within
Albuquerque.293 Their joint motion was filed approximately one month after
the court denied the first set of intervention motions.294 The three organizations
had a long-standing history of representing and advocating for the rights and
interests of the identified communities.295 The motion also provided some
background on each organization’s prior involvement in the reform efforts.296
Both the federal government and the City of Albuquerque opposed intervention
by the organizations.297
The procedural mechanism used by the organizations in Albuquerque was different from that used in similar cases. They sought permissive intervention under
Rule 24(b) instead of intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a).298 The filing indicates that the parties chose this path to intervention to avoid deficiencies
in standing.299 The motion for permissive intervention300 identified three ways
289. United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV, 2015 WL 13747185, at *6
(D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2015). The court referenced the main motion to intervene filed by Antoine Pirard. Id.
Most of the contents of that motion failed to articulate its basis. The remaining eight individually filed
“identical forms with spaces where proposed intervenors can insert their name and contact information.”
Id. Those eight “appear[ed] to support the original filings of Mr. Antoine Pirard” and “include[d] no
argument of their own.” Id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. See United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV, 2015 WL 13747189, at
*2 (D.N.M. June 2, 2015).
294. See id. The delay in filing the motion weighed against the three organizations. The court pointed
to, among other things, the parties having spent months negotiating the terms of the proposed settlement
agreement prior to filing the complaint. See id. at *3–4. This fact presents an interesting quandary for
interested parties: how does one determine whether there is a need to intervene during that considerable
time span of closed negotiations to which the interested party is not privy?
295. Corrected Motion to Intervene on Behalf of People Who Have Mental Disabilities, Who
Experience Homelessness & Who Are Native American, Who Have Encounters with the Albuquerque
Police Department at 3–4, City of Albuquerque, 2015 WL 13747189, ECF No. 107.
296. See id. at 4.
297. City of Albuquerque, 2015 WL 13747189, at *1.
298. Id. at *2.
299. Corrected Motion to Intervene on Behalf of People Who Have Mental Disabilities, Who
Experience Homelessness & Who Are Native American, Who Have Encounters with the Albuquerque
Police Department, supra note 295, at 4. The doctrine of standing is often discussed in cases involving
Rule 24. It often goes unmentioned in court opinions deciding whether to allow a moving party to
intervene in federally initiated police reform litigation. For that reason, a detailed explanation of how
standing can impact the success of motions to intervene is beyond the scope of this Article.
300. Federal Civil Rule 24(b) allows a movant to be permissively granted intervention in existing
litigation. The Rule allows the court to grant intervention, at its discretion, if (1) the movant files a
timely motion that (2) asserts a claim or defense that is in common with a question of law in the
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that the DOJ failed to adequately represent the interests of the organizations’
members. First, Native Americans and homeless individuals who had been victimized were too afraid and distrusting of law enforcement to speak directly to law
enforcement officers.301 Second, the U.S. government failed to address the disparate impact that some Sections of the consent decree, which likely would increase
interactions between police officers and those with mental, developmental, or
other disabilities, would have on those populations.302 Finally, the DOJ representatives did not have the federally recognized expertise in issues related to mental
health that one of the proposed intervenors possessed.303 The motion identified
specific portions of the government’s proposed consent decree that would have a
detrimental impact on persons living with disabilities, if adopted.304
The court decided that the concerns of the community organizations were
adequately represented by the parties.305 It pointed to one of the organizations
participating in the Mental Health Response Advisory Committee designed
and implemented under the settlement agreement.306 And it characterized the dispute over the adequacy of representation as an issue of “different policy
approaches.”307 Finally, the court found that the three issues raised by the organizations to support their argument of inadequate representation were new claims
that went “beyond the scope” of the existing litigation.308 The disparate impact
argument presented by the community organizations actually led to their
undoing. It led the court to express concern that the discovery required to determine the merit of the claims would cause undue delays in the existing case.309
The concern raised by the court here is not unlike those concerns related to general case management for large, structural-reform litigation. Part IV explores the
tensions related to this concern and proposes a viable solution.

underlying suit and (3) will not result in undue prejudice or delay to the existing parties. FED. R. CIV. P.
24(b).
301. Corrected Motion to Intervene on Behalf of People Who Have Mental Disabilities, Who
Experience Homelessness & Who Are Native American, Who Have Encounters with the Albuquerque
Police Department, supra note 295, at 9.
302. Id. at 11.
303. Id. at 10.
304. Id. at 11 (“If implemented, this section would increase the number of encounters between the
City’s police officers and people with mental, developmental or other disabilities, likely increasing usesof-force incidents against them by City police officers and likely increasing the arrests and incarceration
of such people.”).
305. See United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV, 2015 WL 13747189, at
*3 (D.N.M. June 2, 2015).
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See id. at *4. The federal government raised an important issue as to the disparate impact
allegation for which there is no simple answer. It argued that a potential delay in the current reform
efforts would place other communities at risk of experiencing continued unconstitutional policing while
the court and the parties spent time working through the merits of the movant–interveners on behalf of
Native Americans and the homeless. Id.
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6. Seattle
The Seattle CPC also sought to intervene permissively in that city’s pattern or
practice litigation more than one year after the court approved the consent
decree.310 Unlike the community organizations that had sought intervention in the
prior cases, the CPC was created by the City of Seattle under the terms of the
decree. Its membership included ten individuals chosen to represent some of
the diverse communities within Seattle as well as three appointed police union
members.311 There was no category specifically reserved for those impacted by
Seattle Police Department misconduct. The CPC was the first of its kind in DOJ-initiated police reform litigation. The parties agreed that there was “significant community interest” in the litigation and that “[t]he community is a critical resource.”312
The CPC’s and the parties’ filings on the issue reveal the motive of the CPC in
seeking intervention as well as the parties’ objections to the intervention sought.
The CPC intervention was driven by a desire to seek additional time to provide
input and recommendations on policy revisions.313 The organization specifically
sought judicial relief from the deadlines established under the first year monitoring plan.314 This process-oriented intervention is unlike the other remedial interventions attempted by community organizations in other jurisdictions. This filing
exchange could, in some ways, be explained away as a procedural misunderstanding. The CPC argued that it believed the court required a motion to intervene
in order to consider its deadline extension request.315 The opposition articulated
by the federal government potentially provides insight into how the DOJ views
the role of community organizations in DOJ-initiated litigation.

310. Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for Purpose of Proposing Modifications
to Deadlines at 1, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR, 2013 BL 434209 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 26, 2013), ECF No. 90. A pro se litigant and the Seattle Times each also sought to intervene
in the case. The pro se filing does not provide much insight into the purpose of the filer’s motion beyond
his stated intention to “[i]ntervene as a friend [o]f the [c]ourt on behalf of the City of Seattle.” Motion to
Enter the Policy of the Department of Justice & the Question of the Participation of the Washington
State Bar Ass’n as an Expert Witness at 1, City of Seattle, 2013 BL 434209, ECF No. 34. The Rule 24(b)
motion by the Seattle Times centered around the interest of the press to gain information received by the
parties regarding independent monitor applications. See Third Party Seattle Times Co.’s Motion for
Relief from Provisional Protective Order & Motion to Intervene at 1–2, City of Seattle, 2013 BL 434209,
ECF No. 16. The parties previously sought to limit access to that information. Id. at 1. Both motions are
outside the scope of this Article and have not been included in the overall analysis.
311. Settlement Agreement & Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, supra note 106, at 2
(describing the decree’s focus on creating the CPC to “ensure that [its] membership is representative of
the many and diverse communities” based on residential geography, occupation as law enforcement,
religious faith, and those designated as “minority” or “ethnic,” with no specific seat on the commission
for those individuals impacted by police violence).
312. Id.
313. Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for Purpose of Proposing Modifications
to Deadlines, supra note 310, at 2.
314. Id. at 1.
315. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene
for Purpose of Proposing Modifications to Deadlines at 1, City of Seattle, 2013 BL 434209, ECF No.
104.
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The DOJ lawyers preemptively argued that the interests of the CPC were
“adequately protected” under the current composition of parties and contents of
the consent decree.316 The DOJ conceded that the CPC had a significant protectable interest in the litigation but asserted that this interest was “shared by both
current parties.”317 The DOJ went on to include the federal judge assigned to the
litigation as responsible for adequately representing the interests of the community.318 The identification of the protectable interest and assertion of adequate representation proffered by the federal government were made without any such
initial assertion by the CPC. The CPC argued in reply that its independent role as
the voice of the community made it distinctly different from being an entity
within city government.319
This distinction is an important one worth highlighting. The possibility exists
that similarly situated, community-based organizations would not agree with city
government. For example, if the city and CPC were to take opposing positions on
the use of body-worn cameras by officers, there would be no possibility that the
city lawyers would advance and represent the interests of the CPC. Concerns
have been expressed about the expanding surveillance of marginalized communities.320 The CPC also distinguished the engagement required of it under the consent decree from its shared “ultimate objective [of] constitutional and effective
policing” with the federal government.321 The CPC’s motion to intervene was
ultimately denied by the court, which instead granted to the commission only
amici status.322

316. United States’ Combined Response to the CPC’s Motion to Partially Intervene & to the City &
the CPC’s Motions to Extend Certain Deadlines, supra note 196, at 3.
317. Id. at 9.
318. See id. at 10.
319. Reply Memorandum in Support of Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for
Purpose of Proposing Modifications to Deadlines, supra note 315, at 4–5.
320. See Melissa Hellmann, Seattle’s Oversight of Surveillance Technology Is Moving Forward
Slowly, SEATTLE TIMES (June 5, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/
seattles-oversight-of-surveillance-technology-is-moving-forward-slowly/ (detailing the community
privacy concerns regarding previously undisclosed governmental use of surveillance technology that
led to legislative reforms in Seattle); see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 40, at 1829–30
(discussing community privacy concerns related to the use of drones by the government in Compton,
California).
321. Reply Memorandum in Support of Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for
Purpose of Proposing Modifications to Deadlines, supra note 315, at 5.
322. United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR, 2013 BL 434209, at *6–7 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 26, 2013). The estate of Charleena Lyles also attempted to intervene after she was killed in
an officer-involved shooting in 2017. See The Estate of Charleena Lyles’ Emergency Motion to
Intervene for the Purposes of Providing Additional Critical Information to the Court at 1, City of Seattle,
2013 BL 434209, ECF No. 427. Unlike the other intervention attempts discussed in this Article, Ms.
Lyles’ estate sought to intervene in its individual capacity. The Lyles intervention was sought
approximately four years after the Seattle settlement agreement was adopted by the court as a consent
decree. See id. at 1, 5. It was precipitated by the killing of Ms. Lyles during a mental health crisis call for
service. See id. at 1–2. The estate sought to provide information to the court regarding concerns about
officer training, competence, and decisionmaking after Ms. Lyles was fatally shot by officers. Id. at 2–3,
5.
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The Seattle CPC has faced challenges and organizational questions
around its authority and impact.323 Though Seattle’s CPC was granted amici
status, 324 it still encountered difficulty establishing “durable collaborative
partnerships” with police leadership.325 Party status would make it harder
for law enforcement to disregard community input and needs as mere recommendations. As of now, the success of a community organization’s
efforts to be meaningfully engaged in reform litigation is determined by the
extent of its political connections.326 This crucial working relationship
should not be left to the chance that police brass will embrace community
engagement and input or that the marginalized will find some way to leverage the political capital necessary to gain the attention and support of
elected officials. This is especially true considering scholars’ and experts’
identification of a breakdown in community–police relations as a contributing source to patterns and practices of unconstitutional policing.327
There is an inherent tension, despite the DOJ efforts, present in its response
to community motions to intervene. As discussed above, the DOJ has engaged
the community in real-time, on-the-ground discussions about ways to improve
policing in subject jurisdictions. These efforts have included seeking community input during the investigation phase.328 But that engagement virtually disappears once a decision has been made to move forward with filing suit. In
essence, one might observe the DOJ metaphorically saying to interested community leaders and organizations, “Thanks for your help. We’ll take it from
here.” This position is evidenced by DOJ opposition to motions to intervene
filed by those organizations.
7. Baltimore
The 2016 election and subsequent inauguration of Donald Trump presented
unique challenges for the consent decree process in Baltimore. The settlement
agreement was filed with the court on January 12, 2017.329 In April 2017, lawyers
for the DOJ informed the court of Attorney General Sessions’s “grave concerns”
about the proposed decree.330 A motion to intervene was filed by community
members in Baltimore on that same day.

323. Graef, supra note 174, at 35–36.
324. See City of Seattle, 2013 BL 434209, at *6–7. The Seattle CPC later became a permanent
city organization after the city council passed the requisite legislation. See SEATTLE MUN. CODE
§ 3.14.981–.984 (2020), https://perma.cc/EDT2-ABH4.
325. Graef, supra note 174, at 34.
326. See id. at 35.
327. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of
Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 616.
328. See Memorandum of Law in Support of AMA Coalition’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 270,
at 4–5.
329. Consent Decree, supra note 31, at 1, 215.
330. Laura Jarrett & David Shortell, DOJ Has ‘Grave Concerns’ over Baltimore Police Reform Plan,
CNN (Apr. 6, 2017, 5:31 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/us/baltimore-consent-decree-publichearing/index.html [https://perma.cc/KXU2-VUN5].
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Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. and Ralph Moore,
Jr., in his individual capacity, filed a joint motion to intervene in the Baltimore
consent decree process.331 The putative intervenors requested intervention as a
matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) or, in the alternative,
permissively under subrule (b).332 The community group was made up of six
churches, five of which were located in Black neighborhoods.333 The organization
identified their “strong interest in ending unlawful and discriminatory police
practices that have harmed them in the past” along with their desire to see the proposed consent decree fully enforced.334 Mr. Moore was identified as a community
leader, social worker, and lifelong Baltimore resident.335 The filing asserted that
he individually, and the communities he serves, would likely be “harmed again”
by the Baltimore Police Department if the proposed consent decree was not fully
enforced.336 The complaint in intervention filed by the movants included information about the organization’s long-standing efforts and resources to build and
strengthen community–police relationships in Baltimore.337
The putative intervenors also asserted a “public interest” as a basis for intervention since they lived in Baltimore and would be harmed if reforms were not
made.338 Additionally, they highlighted the “recent alarming and recalcitrant
behavior” of the federal government.339 The motion to intervene included a proposed complaint that expounded upon the actions of the federal government
under the new Administration.340
This background framed the putative intervenors’ argument that representation
by the federal government would prove inadequate. The motion discussed the
Trump Administration’s “new and different institutional priorities and constraints.”341 It went on to discuss how the new Administration’s announced position on the issue was “inconsistent with, and adverse to, the continued federal
oversight” needed in Baltimore.342 The argument made in support of intervention

331. Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E.
Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 35.
332. Id. at 1.
333. Id. at 2.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Intervenors Community Churches for
Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore Jr.’s Amended Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs at
13–14, United States v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00099JKB), ECF No. 31-1.
338. Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E.
Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 35, at 4.
339. Id.
340. Complaint in Intervention of Plaintiff-Intervenors Community Churches for Community
Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore, Jr. at 5, Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (No. 1:17-cv00099-JKB), ECF No. 30-2.
341. Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E.
Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 35, at 5.
342. Id. at 6.
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failed to explicitly address the presumption of adequate representation when the
government is a party.
The court denied the motion to intervene just one day after it was filed.343 It
summarized the purposes of the motion as (1) seeking redress for violations and
(2) ensuring enforcement of the decree. The court found that the motion to intervene for the purpose of redressing constitutional violations was moot in light of
the consent decree having been ordered by the court earlier that day. The opinion
goes on to find concerns about enforcement of the decree to be not yet ripe
because the government had yet to do anything to indicate that it would refuse to
comply with the decree.
Several takeaways are important to highlight. The majority of organizations
seeking intervention are recognized by the courts for their local and long-standing
commitment to reform police in their communities. In all instances, the DOJ
opposed intervention efforts. The courts recognized the liberal intervention standard set out by Rule 24(a). Nevertheless, the application of the presumption of
government adequate representation serves as a virtual bar to intervention for
community organizations seeking intervention. The following Part interrogates
the judicial authority cited to support the assertion of presumptive adequate
representation.
IV. HOW COURTS HAVE MISSED THE MARK AND A PATH FORWARD
The court decisions detailed above create what may be perceived as an impenetrable barrier between the reform process and the communities whose lives and
rights the reforms are created to protect. Courts must consider several factors
when analyzing motions under Rule 24. It cannot be ignored that courts must also
balance practical concerns regarding the scope and size of the litigation under
their purview. Although those considerations and responsibilities should not be
understated or overlooked, a more complete analysis of the adequate representation factor and its related presumption is in order. The following Part discusses
case law relied upon by courts in determining whether impacted communities are
adequately represented by the DOJ. It also seeks to illustrate how the denial of
intervention to impacted communities misses the mark. The case law that the
denials rely on either plainly supports intervention, cites precedential authority
misaligned to issues relevant to DOJ-initiated police consent decrees, or ignores
the broader applicability of concerns presented by established precedent.
A. CONTROLLING CASE LAW SUPPORTS INTERVENTION

Some courts deciding whether to grant intervention in DOJ-initiated consent
decrees cite cases that support finding in favor of the putative intervenors. Two of
those cited cases that follow the liberal standard for intervention contemplated by
Rule 24(a)’s amendment are discussed below.

343. See Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 815.
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Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America,344 the seminal Supreme Court
case on intervention, is aligned with the standard set out in Rule 24(a). Trbovich
involved the efforts of a union member to intervene in a lawsuit brought by the
U.S. Secretary of Labor.345 The Secretary sought the removal of elected union
officials for alleged violations under the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.346 Movant–intervenors are required to show only that the
representation by the original parties “may be” inadequate to serve their interests.347 Some of the factors that courts have analyzed when determining if interests are adequately represented include (1) whether the arguments made by an
original party to advance their interests would undoubtedly be the same as the
movant’s interest arguments, (2) if the original party is both capable and willing
to make those same arguments, and (3) if the movant offers a necessary element
to the proceedings that the original party will neglect.348
This “relatively low”349 bar encounters enhanced scrutiny when the putative
representative party is the government. Several circuits have established a rebuttable presumption of adequate representation when the government is a party.350
The Third and Fourth Circuits require the movant to make a “compelling” or
“strong” showing that the representation is inadequate.351 In the Seventh Circuit,
movants must make a showing of gross negligence or bad faith on the part of the
government.352
Courts considering whether impacted communities have successfully rebutted
the presumption of adequate governmental representation also routinely cite
Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Service353 despite the opinion in that case supporting the opposite conclusion. The Ninth Circuit granted

344. 404 U.S. 528 (1972)
345. Id. at 529–30.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 538 n.10.
348. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996).
349. Gregory R. Manring, It’s Time for an Intervention!: Resolving the Conflict Between Rule 24(a)
(2) and Article III Standing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2525, 2531 (2017).
350. See, e.g., United States v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e
presume that the United States adequately represents the interests of those prisoners.”); Ruthardt v.
United States, 303 F.3d 375, 386 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Adequacy is presumed, although rebuttably so, where
a government agency is the representative party.”); United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391,
401 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Normally, ‘a presumption of adequate representation generally arises when the
representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interests of the
absentee.’”).
351. See Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 888 F.3d 52, 60–62 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that there was a
compelling showing for a religious nonprofit to intervene where Pennsylvania was suing the federal
government for allowing an exemption for religious business to pay for contraceptive coverage); Stuart
v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that abortion providers could not intervene in
defending a constitutional challenge to abortion laws).
352. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that
the state legislature could not intervene to defend a challenge against Wisconsin’s new abortion laws
because it could not show that the state attorney general would not provide adequate representation).
353. 66 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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intervention to the State of Arizona and Apache County, Arizona after finding
that the federal government did not adequately represent those intervenors.354
The decision pointed to the federal government’s responsibility to “present the
broad public interest.”355 Moreover, the court reasoned that “[i]nadequate representation is most likely to be found when the applicant asserts a personal interest
that does not belong to the general public.”356 The reasoning asserted by the court
here is applicable to police reform cases. The federal government has acknowledged its responsibility to represent the varied and diverse viewpoints of those
who live and work in American cities.357 Moreover, police reform cases considering motions to intervene have failed to acknowledge that the interests of disproportionately impacted communities are different from those of the general
public.358 Instead, they have exacerbated what Sunita Patel calls a formal structure by which the “minority or marginalized voices are . . . silenced in liberal
democratic processes.”359
B. WHY THE PRESUMPTION SHOULD BE REBUTTED

The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon denied community organization intervention in the Portland consent decree.360 The court cited Arakaki v.
Cayetano, the source of a commonly used test for adequate representation, to support the denial.361 The following subsection argues that the issues unique to DOJinitiated police reform efforts deserve closer examination by the courts.
1. Shared General Interest in Consent Decree Is Not Enough—Adequate
Representation of Impacted Community Interests Should Require More
The democratic and representational responsibilities owed by the federal government to all Americans expose the fallacy of presumptive adequate representation, especially in police reform litigation initiated by the DOJ. Thus far, the
representation analysis employed by courts in the police reform context is limited
and fails to consider some key distinctions between the interests and roles of the
federal government and community organizations seeking intervention. Lawyers

354. Id. at 1499.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 18.
358. See Pierson et al., supra note 284, at 736 (describing the process by which researchers
“compiled and analysed a dataset detailing nearly 100 million traffic stops” in dozens of jurisdictions
across the country, and concluding that “police stops and search decisions suffer from persistent racial
bias”); John Gramlich, From Police to Parole, Black and White Americans Differ Widely in Their Views
of Criminal Justice System, PEW RES. CTR. (May 21, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2019/05/21/from-police-to-parole-black-and-white-americans-differ-widely-in-their-views-of- criminaljustice-system/ [https://perma.cc/4RJQ-WM25] (“[Members of the Black community] are also more
likely than whites to have specific criticisms about the way officers do their jobs, particularly when it
comes to police interactions with their community.”).
359. Patel, supra note 39, at 806.
360. See United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265-SI, 2013 WL 12309780, at *2 (D. Or.
Feb. 19, 2013).
361. See id. at *6 (citing Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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for both the federal government and subject local jurisdictions highlight the various community interests that they must weigh throughout the implementation
phase of a consent decree. The current analysis has been distilled to whether the
putative intervenor and the federal government share a specific mutual interest.
Courts have employed a simplistic approach to determining this mutual interest:
they ask whether both parties desire the remedial efforts of the consent decree to
be successful.362 In short, the court simply asks whether they both seek to remedy
unconstitutional policing. Allowing a blanket interest in constitutional policing to
serve as a factor in the intervention analysis, however, undermines that very inquiry. An analysis that fails to take into account the particularized interest of
communities impacted by police violence could benefit from an enhanced understanding of the limited role that the federal government serves in the litigation.
A desire to bring about change is not a magic wand. The process of implementing police consent decrees takes place across a variety of substantive areas in law
enforcement. It is unlike traditional litigation in which one party pursues an
action against another to recover damages as a result of a single incident or situation. Pattern or practice litigation involves, instead, detailed policy revisions and
training on use of force, search and seizure, use of body-worn cameras, community policing plans, and various ways to ensure accountability within departments.363 The intricate nature of the work requires more than the perspectives of
law enforcement and local and federal governments. The voice and insight of
impacted communities are essential to the implementation phase. Indeed, current
consent decree processes have increased their outreach to community members.
That outreach, described above, has been a one-sided arrangement with community members being surveyed and informed but never being recognized or
respected as essential parties at all stages of the process. Party status for organizations representing the interests of impacted communities would provide space
and opportunity for meaningful engagement in every aspect of the reform process, not merely those aspects on which the DOJ seeks input.
The stability and continuity to be gained by granting party status to impacted
communities has also been ignored. The implementation of police reform consent
decrees takes place over the span of a number of years.364 The consent decree
involving reforms within the Pittsburgh Police Department lasted more than eight
years.365 The decree in Detroit stretched out for nearly thirteen years.366 In many
instances, elected officials change on both the federal and local levels during

362. See, e.g., United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV, 2015 WL
13747185, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2015); City of Portland, 2013 WL 12309780, at *7.
363. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 10.
364. See id.
365. Order upon Motion Granting Joint Motion to Terminate Consent Decree & Dismiss This Case,
United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 2:97-cv-00354-RJC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2005).
366. Tresa Baldas, Detroit Police Finally Rid of Federal Oversight, DET. FREE PRESS (Mar. 31, 2016,
8:35 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2016/03/31/detroit-police-finallyrid-federal-oversight/82491776/ [https://perma.cc/223A-54BH].
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these implementation periods.367 Changes have also occurred in the courtappointed independent monitor selected to work with the parties and the court toward implementation.368 During this time the parties discuss and decide how to
carry out the reform mandates to serve the communities impacted by the pattern
or practice of unconstitutional policing. The parties may also jointly decide to
revise a term or set of terms in the original agreement. Party status for impacted
community organizations would provide a role and opportunity for them to formally participate in the implementation decisionmaking.
Party status could also potentially provide a stable source of continuing local
expertise, especially in the instance where the putative intervenor has a longstanding history of working to reform police practices. Intervention by impacted
community organizations in reform litigation should also address any concerns
that private plaintiffs would simply use the process for their own financial
gain.369 The reform processes under § 12601 do not presently allow for monetary
damages.370 In sum, the decisionmaking processes involved require more than a
stated commitment to the decree or the ability to strategize.
2. The Federal Government Is Unlikely to Make the Arguments of Impacted
Communities
The federal government, as discussed above, has recently demonstrated that
there are some arguments that it is unwilling to make on behalf of impacted communities. It is also important to explore how federalism concerns have impacted
the depth and breadth of federal intervention. As expounded upon by Burke
Marshall, the federal government is constrained by issues of comity and federalism that are unique to the American system of government.371 Though some
scholars have rightfully challenged Marshall’s view of federalism,372 the federal
government has cited it as a reason for making certain litigation choices.
Whether the litigation strategy is rooted in federalism concerns or simply in
diverging opinions about how best to achieve lasting reforms, it is illogical to

367. See Daniel Beekman & Susan Kelleher, Jenny Durkan: Former U.S. Attorney Brings
Experience, High-Powered Allies, but Also Draws Scrutiny, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017, 6:48 AM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/former-u-s-attorney-brings-experience-hi gh-poweredallies-but-also-draws-scrutiny/.
368. See, e.g., Order at 1–2, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-JAC (E.D. Mich.
July 24, 2009), ECF No. 401 (removing court-appointed federal monitor from the case).
369. See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 58 (2009).
370. An amendment to § 14141 was introduced in Congress in 1999 and 2000. The amendment
would have provided for a private right of action for pattern or practice violations, among other things.
See Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 2000, H.R. 3927, 106th Cong. § 502 (2000); Law
Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 2656, 106th Cong. § 501 (1999). The proposed
amendment—in both 1999 and 2000—never made it out of committee.
371. See BURKE MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 40 (1964).
372. See, e.g., Michal R. Belknap, The Vindication of Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System
and the Anti-Civil-Rights Violence of the 1960s, 33 EMORY L.J. 93, 101 (1984) (recounting critics,
including law professors, of Burke Marshall’s approach to addressing violence against Black
communities in the South).
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presume that the federal government will provide adequate representation on
behalf of impacted communities. As a practical matter, the role and perspective
of the DOJ are distinctly different from those of impacted communities. The federal government plays the crucial roles of initiating an investigation and then pursuing reforms where unconstitutional patterns or practices of policing have been
discovered. The importance of that role cannot be overstated. Federal authority to
specifically address police brutality had been long overdue.373 The DOJ must fulfill its primary obligation and responsibility to enforce the laws of the United
States. The federal government will have greater insight into law enforcement
national trends and best practices. It also has access to experts and resources. The
essential arguments made by the federal government will be informed by that
insight.
The federal government’s insight, however, does not negate the essential role
and perspective that impacted communities could bring to the litigation process.
Just as the ability of the federal government to make arguments from the national
perspective is invaluable to the process, so too should the local perspective of
impacted communities not be overlooked. Arguments related to the impact and
effectiveness of local police practices are best made by the communities affected
by those practices. Many community organizations that previously sought intervention in DOJ pattern or practice suits have demonstrated long-standing engagement in police reform efforts.374 The historical knowledge and experience
that comes from that engagement could enable the organizations to make specific arguments for how best to design and implement key policy revisions.
Arguments made on behalf of local communities could add a necessary layer
to newly developed policies related to civilian oversight, accountability, and
community policing.
More specifically, there is no indication that the DOJ has previously engaged
impacted communities on what arguments should be made on their behalf.
Instead, the details from prior intervention attempts highlight instances when
the DOJ has refused to do just that. As discussed above, the community intervention efforts in Portland were made because the federal government backed
away from race-based reform efforts. Separate and apart from previous interventions, community organizations have historically made concerted efforts to establish or expand the effectiveness of civilian oversight as well as additional
mechanisms to increase police accountability.375 Arguments made by impacted

373. See Hardaway, supra note 50 (discussing the persistent problem of police violence in America).
374. See supra Sections III.B.1–4.
375. See Justice Coalition of Vallejo: Liberty and Justice for All, https://perma.cc/GBS4-UTX3 (last
visited Dec. 9, 2020); March for Alton, Philando, and All Black Lives: Abolition Now!, ASSATA’S
DAUGHTERS (July 15, 2016), https://www.assatasdaughters.org/statements#march-for-alton-philando-andall-black-lives-abolition-now [https://perma.cc/CP26-BQK5] (calling for a number of justice reforms
including police accountability); Oakland Should Lead the Way: Proposal for Effective Police Oversight,
ANTI POLICE-TERROR PROJECT (Sept. 2019), https://www.antipoliceterrorproject.org/oakland-should-leadthe-way-proposal-for-effective-police-oversight [https://perma.cc/343S-BEDB].
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communities, but not espoused by the DOJ, can also be found in amici
filings.376
3. History Demonstrates the Federal Government’s Neglect of Impacted
Communities and Their Experiences
During the first 150 years of American history—what legal scholar
Stephen Rushin refers to as the “Hands-Off Era”—the federal government
made the deliberate choice to ignore police misconduct on the state level.377
This hands-off approach was not due to ignorance. The Wickersham
Commission’s report on lawlessness in law enforcement released in the
early 1930s provided official notice to the federal government that local
police departments across the country were employing brutality to extract
coerced confessions.378 Nevertheless, the federal government remained
essentially silent for nearly six more decades.
Rushin categorizes this timeframe as the “Buildup Era,” and he generously
gives the federal government and judiciary credit for taking some steps to
make the cost of police misconduct too great for departments, whether that be
financially or legally, through the loss of improperly obtained evidence.379
This position fails to acknowledge the minuscule impact those efforts had on
police departments. The heightened burden of proving misconduct on a civil or
criminal level was often too great for already marginalized and presumed
guilty individuals to overcome. Local governments won far more cases than
they lost.380 And the losses they incurred rarely prompted them to incorporate
the concerns of impacted communities into the way localities policed those
communities.
During the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson’s Law Enforcement Assistance
Act was an explicit declaration of the federal government’s position on police
brutality.381 It came about after uprisings in Harlem after fifteen-year-old James
376. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Summary at 1, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th
Cir. 2002) (No. 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC), ECF No. 403 (noting that the intervenors include the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Los Angeles, ACLU of Southern California, Homeboy
Industries, Asian Pacific American Legal Center, and Radio Sin Fronteras).
377. STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 8–9 (2017).
378. RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PART
1: RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE ON OFFICIAL LAWLESSNESS, at ix (Samuel Walker ed., 1997), http://
www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/1965_WickershamCommPt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JF5H-8Q2G] (describing the rampant use of police torture, referred to as the “third degree,” to obtain
coerced confessions).
379. RUSHIN, supra note 377, at 10–12.
380. Harmon, supra note 369, at 9 (describing the inadequate and ineffective nature of criminal and
civil remedies available to redress and deter police abuses).
381. The Law Enforcement Assistance Act was a part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 34 U.S.C. § 10101 (2018). At the signing of the
bill, Lyndon Johnson declared his commitment to law and order through the provision of aid to local
governments in their charge to “promote the rule of law.” See Statement by the President Following the
Signing of Law Enforcement Assistance Bills. AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 22, 1965), https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-following-the-signing-law-enforcementassistance-bills [https://perma.cc/KJE7-DTKE].
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Powell was shot in the street by a police officer.382 Prior to that time, the federal
government had enacted legislation aimed at addressing purported civilian terrorism against members of the Black community. Johnson and Congress viewed the
anger of the impacted communities of color with disdain.383 The legislation left
no doubt that the interests of the federal government and local law enforcement
authorities (and likely the municipalities themselves) were aligned. Johnson was
of the position, as he stated in a speech following the uprisings in Detroit, that
federal intervention in local police matters was appropriate when state and local
police could not “end disorder.”384 For Johnson, intervention was necessary on
behalf of law enforcement to maintain “law and order,” not to protect those in
impacted communities.385 The passage of the law signaled a wholesale rejection
of any argument that the federal government was interested in protecting the constitutional rights of impacted communities of color in the context of policing.
Johnson’s Act did not just send troops into cities to restore order. It also gave financial support to enlarge local police agencies.386 Johnson also illegally authorized surveillance of Black liberationist and civil rights organizations.387 These
legislative actions were designed to snuff out civil unrest without addressing or
acknowledging the injustices, specifically police brutality, that prompted the
uprisings.
The Johnson Administration is highlighted here to illustrate how the federal
government has aligned itself with local government and law enforcement.
Reticence of certain political officials and parties to intervene in local police matters tells a story of unreliable and sporadic efforts by the federal government, at
best. In fact, most of history shows that the federal government has failed to successfully intervene to defend the constitutional rights of local citizens.388
C. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A PATH FORWARD

Courts’ analysis of the adequate representation factor under Rule 24 has failed
to fully assess the interests of impacted communities. Moreover, the analysis has
382. See Martin Arnold, Police Board Absolves Gilligan in Slaying of Negro Teen-ager; No Violation
of Rules Found—Shooting Led to Riots in Harlem and Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1964, at A1.
383. See Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Speech to the Nation on Civil Disorders (July 27,
1967) (transcript available at https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-271967-speech-nation-civil-disorders).
384. Id.
385. Statement by the President Following the Signing of Law Enforcement Assistance Bills., supra
note 381.
386. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 87 (2016) (discussing the Johnson Administration’s provision of
money to municipal law enforcement agencies for the hiring of more officers, to “professionalize” the
agencies, as well as the provision of military-grade equipment).
387. Adam Janos, Nixon and Johnson Pushed the CIA to Spy on U.S. Citizens, Declassified
Documents Show, HISTORY (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/cia-surveillance-operationchaos-60s-protest [https://perma.cc/2TJV-4QTW].
388. RUSHIN, supra note 377, at 3–8 (discussing how for 150 years of American history the federal
government has, on the whole, failed to consistently intervene to enforce the rights of local community
members while deliberately choosing to ignore police abuses).
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failed to give full consideration to the ways in which the interests of the federal
government are not fully aligned with those impacted by police violence. The
DOJ model of community engagement and consultation does not enable the federal government to adequately represent the interests of communities impacted
by police violence. Federal courts that presume the federal government
adequately represents those interests have sorely missed the mark of remedying
unconstitutional police practices. Expanding the analysis beyond the limited
focus of whether the federal government has an interest in a successfully implemented consent decree is worth consideration.
Texas v. United States provides an intervention framework useful in the context of marginalized communities and the federal government.389 The Fifth
Circuit in that case held that the presumption of adequate representation is successfully rebutted when a movant identifies an adversity of interests between
itself and the government representative.390 An adversity of interests can be demonstrated by showing that the government has interests connected to its relationship with the other existing party and the courts with jurisdiction.391 The court
stated that “[t]he lack of unity in all objectives, combined with real and legitimate
additional or contrary arguments, is sufficient to demonstrate that the representation may be inadequate.”392 Movants are required to make a connection between
the claimed divergent interests and how they affect the litigation.393
As they were in Texas v. United States, the federal government’s interests in
DOJ-initiated police consent decrees are distinctly different from the interests of
impacted communities. The Attorney General made the Trump Administration’s
desire to have a good working relationship with local law enforcement widely
known.394 Considerable financial resources were provided from the federal government to municipalities and their police departments.395 These resources included
grants from Homeland Security and the DOJ, as well as military surplus equipment.396 The DOJ has also failed to include community interests and perspectives
beyond the investigation phase of its police reform efforts. Court filings indicate that
the DOJ has desired to have sole control over the implementation of the reform
mandates.397 Finally, the DOJ readily admitted that it has a responsibility to

389. 805 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015). In Texas, noncitizens were permitted to intervene in an action
regarding Homeland Security’s deferred action program after successfully rebutting the presumption of
adequate representation by the federal government. Id. at 663. Intervenors pointed to the governmental
interests in an expansive interpretation of government authority, enforcing immigration laws, and
maintaining a working relationship with the states to demonstrate divergent interests. Id.
390. Id. at 661–62.
391. See id. at 662.
392. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2014)).
393. See id.
394. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 5.
395. See Alicia Parlapiano, The Flow of Money and Equipment to Local Police, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/23/us/flow-of-money-and-equipment-to-local-police.html.
396. Id.
397. See supra note 111.
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represent the interests of all citizens.398
This lack of unity in objectives between the DOJ and impacted communities
has manifested itself in ways that undoubtedly have concrete effects on the litigation. The DOJ has emphasized the importance of strong relationships with law
enforcement over the importance of consent decrees.399 That prioritization led to
the DOJ’s failure to honor its agreement in principle with the City of Chicago.400
In Baltimore, the DOJ officially attempted to delay, and perhaps attempted to
abandon, reform efforts.401 This, coupled with the federal government’s supply of
military grade weapons and other technologies to local law enforcement efforts,
indicates that its diverging interests impact the litigation.
The current top-down model that excludes community insight from the consent
decree process prioritizes efficiency over the need to enable impacted communities to build positive working relationships with their local law enforcement
agencies. As it currently stands, litigation reform efforts serve only to reinforce
the authoritative and hierarchical frameworks that divide community and law
enforcement by relegating impacted communities to nonparty status.
Courts inclined to recognize that the federal government does not adequately
represent the significant interests of impacted communities will have legitimate,
practical concerns over the size and scope of the litigation. It is the courts’ responsibility to ensure that reform efforts do not become unduly burdened by divergent
viewpoints and agendas that may prevent the court from maintaining order.
There is a balance to be struck between those practical concerns and the courts’
responsibility to ensure that interested parties are not excluded from litigation.
The following discussion outlines the framework for establishing the outer
edges for evaluating motions filed by community organizations under Rule 24.
1. Significant Interest Demonstrated by Community Engagement and Efforts to
Reform Questionable Police Practices
Some will undoubtedly be concerned that favorable rulings for community
organizations seeking intervention may open the floodgates for intervenors with
varying perspectives and motives to unduly burden the reform process. Insight
and guidance from those impacted by police misconduct are integral components
to a healthy and accountable law enforcement agency. They are also essential to
the implementation of successful reform processes. Courts seeking to ensure that
the insight and expertise of impacted communities are being utilized in a meaningful way should examine the historical engagement efforts of the putative intervenor. As seen in previous motions to intervene, community organizations in
certain jurisdictions have worked for many years to bring policing concerns to
the attention of local elected and selected officials. This community perspective

398. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 13–14.
399. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 5.
400. See United States’ Statement of Interest Opposing Proposed Consent Decree at 1–3, Illinois v.
City of Chicago, No. 1:17-cv-06260 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2018), ECF No. 160.
401. See Motion for Continuance of Public Fairness Hearing, supra note 34, at 1.
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should be buttressed by the organization’s knowledge of both current and historical community–police relations, local police department practices and policies,
and community concerns about the police services received. Although several of
the organizations highlighted in this research had long tenures within their respective communities, length of engagement around reform efforts should not be
dispositive. It could, however, be used as a factor to demonstrate how a comparatively short DOJ investigation should not be presumed to usurp the need for direct
community representation in police structural reform litigation.
2. Specious Intervention Attempts by Anti-reformists Do Not Meet the
Intervention Standard
The legislative intent and purpose of § 12601 is to provide injunctive relief to
those impacted by unconstitutional policing. Structural police reform litigation
under § 12601 is not the appropriate vehicle or mechanism for anti-reform sentiment or advocacy. Rule 24, although liberal, does contain essential requirements.
Of most relevance here is the requirement that a movant possess an interest
that is likely to be impaired by the litigation. By the time that the parties have
entered into a consent decree, the DOJ has determined—and the local government has agreed—that the federal government has enough evidence to support a
finding of pervasive unconstitutional policing. An outside party asserting an interest against the decree would essentially be advocating for the continuation of
unconstitutional practices by law enforcement for which there can be no cognizable interest. Accordingly, intervention by organizations should be limited to community organizations that represent the interests of marginalized communities
impacted by the pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. To date, the only
conceivable intervention attempts against reform efforts have come from police
unions.402
Impacted community organizations granted intervention during the remedial
phase of reform litigation can serve to benefit the implementation process. As discussed above, the historical perspective and on-the-ground insight to be gleaned
from marginalized communities are essential components to the reform process.
Giving equal party status to impacted communities and local law enforcement
also serves to provide a foundation for positive community–police relations
beyond the reform process. To that end, providing a seat at the table to impacted
communities is aligned with the statutory aims of § 12601. The same cannot be
said of community and civic organizations whose primary interest lies in supporting local law enforcement from federal reforms. Any such specious claims are
tangential to reform litigation and do not meet the requirements of Rule 24(a). It
would be appropriate to rebuff attempts to intervene by those with the purpose of
thwarting reform efforts or not impacted by police violence.
402. Hardaway, supra note 50, at 193–98 (arguing that police union assertions of collective
bargaining interests in police reform litigation should not satisfy Rule 24(a) because those rights—
limited to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment—are outside the scope of the managerial
policy revisions covered by law enforcement consent decrees).
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3. Collaboration and Joint Legal Representation of Community Organizations
Limiting the number of attorneys of record is another way to prevent structural
reform litigation from becoming unnecessarily unwieldy. In many instances,
there have been several community organizations working to support those
impacted by police violence and misconduct. As discussed above, some of these
organizations have worked to remedy police misconduct in a number of different
ways over the course of several years. Many of those efforts began before the
DOJ initiated its investigations. Indeed, many community organizations have
been instrumental in gaining the attention of the DOJ and assisting in its
investigations.
Although those efforts are invaluable, it is important to avoid situations where
there are a number of lawyers representing each distinct and marginalized community. For instance, it is conceivable that the LGBTQIAþ, homeless, and Black
communities impacted by police violence would be supported by different community organizations. It is impractical to expect, however, that each of those
organizations be represented by separate and distinct legal counsel. Instead, it
should be required that the community organizations representing impacted communities agree on the selection of a trial counsel team to represent the collective
interests of each marginalized community. To streamline that representation, the
organizations should be expected to independently reach a formalized agreement
on their objectives, priorities, and means for resolving differences. The court
should not be required to address or manage those issues.
CONCLUSION
Organizations seeking intervention in other contexts have successfully rebutted
the presumption of adequate representation.403 However, federal courts presiding
over DOJ-initiated police reform cases have without exception found that community organizations have failed to rebut the presumption of adequate representation.404 The decision in United States v. City of Los Angeles is often cited to
support the denial of motions to intervene as a matter of right filed on behalf of
community organizations.405 But the court’s analysis of community efforts to
intervene is inherently deficient in identifying and addressing the interests of
impacted communities. The current top-down model being used to reform local
departments has historically excluded impacted communities despite recognition
that input and engagement from those stakeholders are key components.
Not only is asserting that the federal government adequately represents the
interests of communities impacted by police violence factually inaccurate, but
also court decisions denying community organizations the right to intervene in
police reform litigation run counter to the purpose and intent of Rule 24. The
403. E.g., Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995);
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1983); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886,
887 (9th Cir. 1980).
404. See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 402–04 (9th Cir. 2002).
405. Id.
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language and comments of the amended Rule fail to support the current judicial
findings that intervention hinges on adequate or satisfactory representation of
interests.406 Thus, a cursory or perfunctory analysis of the adequacy of representation by courts in a manner that stifles the options of putative intervenors circumvents or ignores the purpose and intent of the drafters’ amended Rule.
Party status for community organizations representative of those impacted by
police violence could be beneficial in a number of ways. The aims of this Article
are to recognize the invaluable and irreplaceable insight to be gained by impacted
communities and to provide a framework in the reform process for community
organizations to have a long-sought place at the litigation table. The willingness
of a court to formally recognize the importance of impacted communities to the
process also has reparative benefits. It could address concerns of distrust and misgivings by granting to marginalized communities full access to aspects of the process from which they have long been excluded. Of equal importance, it would
provide the opportunity to ensure that needed conversations and understanding
occur between community and police regarding challenges of policing in contemporary American cities as the parties brainstorm solutions and policies.

406. See Kaplan, supra note 138, at 401–02.

